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PAHR APPEALS TO BOGOTA NOT TO RISK HOSTAGES' LIVES

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[Special DIE PRESSE report: "Hostages Taken at Reception in Colombia; Austrian Ambassador Seized by Terrorists"]

[Excerpt] Immediately after having learned about the events in Bogota, Foreign Minister Pahr set up a crisis staff and summoned the Colombian ambassador to the Foreign Ministry. "I'll do anything humanly possible to bring about the release of Ambassador Selzer and to insure his safety," the minister stressed in a talk with DIE PRESSE. Pahr has sent a telegram to the Colombian foreign minister, urgently requesting the Bogota government to avoid anything that might endanger the hostages, and to abstain from the use of force.

KREISKY REJECTS AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY EXAMPLE FOR AFGHANISTAN

KREISKY REJECTS AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY EXAMPLE FOR AFGHANISTAN

VIENNA--After the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday [26 February], Chancellor Kreisky did not seem very happy with the proposals calling for Afghanistan's "neutralization following Austria's example." "They cannot be compared at all.... People who say such things do not think out their ideas to the end...." For example, there were four occupation powers in Austria and "the Russians got something in return for their withdrawal: namely, the withdrawal of the Western powers from Austria." Moreover, he said, it is nonsense to speak of a guaranteed neutrality for Afghanistan following Austria's example. "Our neutrality is certainly not guaranteed, nor has it been forced upon us. It was voluntarily proclaimed by all parties represented in parliament. There is absolutely no reference to neutrality contained in the State Treaty...." With idle talk about the need to solve the Afghanistan question following Austria's example, Kreisky said, "our country is not rendered a good service...."

BULGARIA'S LUكانOV, ANDROSCH DISCUSS JOINT PROJECTS

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"The possibility of a 'trilateral' cooperation is being considered by Bulgaria for developing its large coal and manganese ore deposits, with Austria and the FRG as its partners. This was revealed yesterday [22 February] at a Vienna press conference held by Vice Chancellor Androsch and Bulgarian Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Andrey Lukyanov. During their economic talks, Androsch and Lukyanov also discussed a number of other major projects involving, among others, the Voest-Alpine Steel Corporation. "Pending projects include among others a pump storage power plant to be built in Chairsa, with an envisaged Austrian share in deliveries worth 1.5 billion schillings, cooperation in the production of air-conditioning equipment to be sold in third markets, as well as cooperation regarding the construction of ski lifts, also to be sold in third markets--according to Lukanov, especially in the USSR.

"Lukanov declared that Bulgaria is 'not very keen' on barter transactions. Rather, it takes special interest in concluding long-term cooperation agreements including production and marketing. Wherever this seems expedient, such cooperation could also be 'trilateral' or multilateral, he said. On the other hand, Lukanov sees hardly any chances for implementing a suggestion by Androsch to use Austrian surpluses, for example, in trade with Bulgaria for partly covering Austria's deficit in trade with Bulgaria. In that case, he said, the difference between the foreign currency systems would turn out to be an obstacle."
GENERAL CLOSE COMMENTS ON OUSTER FROM DEFENSE COMMITTEE

LD271625 Brussels LE SOIR in French 24-25 Feb 80 pp 1, 2 ID


[Text] On Friday the Cabinet decided to fire Gen Robert Close from his job as chairman of the Committee for National Defense Questions "in the interests of the service." Mr Martens said that this decision has been taken because the government disapproves of the content of some articles written by the general and published recently which, according to the prime minister, criticized the government and some of the country's leaders.

The articles to which Mr Martens was referring were about Belgian defense policy and, more particularly, about the appropriateness of deploying medium-range missiles on our territory. The general had been particularly critical of the Belgian Socialist Party [BSP] chairman, Mr Van Miert, and all those who, by rejecting the missiles, were "the tools of Soviet propaganda, whether consciously or unconsciously."

The first of these articles was published in LE SOIR of 12 December 1979; a second article was published by a specialized English-language journal called "NATO's 15 NATIONS." As everybody remembers, the government finally agreed to the deployment of the missiles on Belgian territory provided there was no improvement in East-West relations in 6 months which made this deployment unnecessary in the government's eyes.

During an interview granted to LE SOIR on Friday evening, General Close maintained his former stances on defense problems and regretted the fact that the government, under pressure from some of its members, has exploited politically what was merely a personal view.

The Cabinet decision was supported by all the ministers present. The subject was not on the agenda but when it was raised by a Cabinet member, all his colleagues agreed with the step taken against General Close.

Indeed, it is a radical step since the chairman of the Committee for National Defense Questions is directly responsible to the prime minister; firing the person holding this post means sending him back into the framework of the army where he is answerable to the General Staff and National Defense Ministry.

On Friday government circles mentioned the possibility of the Ground Forces General Staff--from which Major-General Close originally came--taking "appropriate measures": However, no mention was made of what these "measures" might be.

Following the publication of his article in LE SOIR, National Defense Minister Desmarets asked General Close not to engage in a polemical debate with the president of a political party. The former chairman of the Committee for National Defense Questions agreed. However, according to General Close, the article which appeared in the January issue of NATO's 15 NATIONS had been written and sent to the journal in question before the publication of the article in our newspaper.
Strained Relations

The publication of the second article sparked a storm of protest—Mr Tobback, BSP deputy for Lourain, threatened not to vote for the defense budget unless steps were taken against General Close. It was probably that threat and possibly others which led to the government decision to penalize the general. In any case, the decision has come at a time when relations between some members of Mr Martens' team and some military authorities are strained to say the least. In our Thursday edition we mentioned Budget Minister Spitaels' refusal to give the armed forces additional money to buy fuel. The step to bring Major-General Close into line is probably to be seen as an example aimed at other "rebel" general officers.

According to the former chairman of the Committee for National Defense Questions, the incident which led to his firing is merely a pretext. Indeed, in face of the reactions sparked by the article published in NATO's 15 NATIONS, General Close was once more asked to give the defense minister an explanation; in this letter, published by Mr Desmarets' office, the general explains that he never "intended to attack Mr Van Miert's honor or cast suspicion on his good faith."

"I used my personal right to freedom of speech," General Close said. "There is no special immunity which protects party chairmen and prevents a citizen from reacting to their statements. My reaction should not be interpreted as that of the committee chairman but as that of General Close who has the right to voice his opinions like any other citizen."

According to General Close the effect is totally out of proportion to the cause: "I wrote what I wrote and nobody will persuade me to take back anything I said because I am much too aware of the weak points in our security. The threats now facing us make it vital for the population to become aware of the danger. Contrary to everything which Mr Spitaels might think, the generals who have complained are right: It is their duty to point out the danger and warn the government of the gravity of the situation."

General Close thinks that the problem regarding the possibility of the armed forces running short of fuel is a coincidence: Without this problem the incident between the general and the government would have been passed over. However, General Close continued: "It is a shameful waste to ask the nation to make sacrifices which hit the taxpayer—military purchases cost billions of francs—and yet deny it the means to use its equipment."

With regard to the steps taken against him, General Close is quite calm: "I am amused by what is happening," he said. "The 'disciplinary measure' taken against me has probably been engineered. I do not know who has engineered it or against whom. As you know, a great deal has been said about Mr Spitaels: For me his is the government's Saint-Just [Reference to leading figure in French Revolution]. He is talking of sweeping savings in the budgets while his colleague Desmarets has recognized the armed forces' fuel problems."

When the possibility of further disciplinary measures being taken against him was mentioned, this time by the Army General Staff, General Close smiled: "Where do you expect them to send me? As military attaché to Djakarta? I would like nothing better, I love traveling."
BUNDESTAG TO HEAR GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON SOLIDARITY WITH U.S.

LD271544 Hamburg DPA in German 1428 GMT 27 Feb 80 LD

[Text] Bonn--The Bundestag foreign policy debate, to be held at the request of the CDU/CSU opposition, will open on Thursday with a government statement by Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The government decided this at short notice during the Cabinet meeting today. It was officially announced yesterday that opposition leader Helmut Kohl will be the first speaker in the parliamentary debate, which is scheduled to last 4 hours.

According to Government Spokesman Klaus Boelling, the chancellor will reaffirm in his government statement, just 1 week before his talks with U.S. President Jimmy Carter in Washington, Bonn's solidarity with the United States and its reliability as an alliance partner. The chancellor will also emphasize the government's efforts to help solve the crisis in closest consultation with the United States and other Western allies.

On the question of Bonn joining in the U.S. boycott of the Olympic games in Moscow, according to Boelling the Federal Government will probably reaffirm its view that there is still time to make a decision and Moscow should be given the opportunity to establish conditions which will enable all states to attend. The subject of the Olympics was touched upon only briefly in the Cabinet meeting, according to the government spokesman.

DEFENSE SPENDING TO INCREASE; DESTROYERS BOUND FOR INDIAN OCEAN

LD271246 Hamburg DPA in German 1946 GMT 27 Feb 80 LD

[Text] Bonn--The Federal Government proposes to increase its defense spending in the 1980 fiscal year by 3 percent in real terms. DPA learned from a reliable source that this was decided by the Federal Security Council at a meeting in Bonn today.

According to this source, Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt will officially announce this new increase in tomorrow's foreign affairs debate in the Bundestag. It was said that he would make that promise to President Jimmy Carter when he visits Washington next week.

The U.S. Government has repeatedly urged the Federal Republic to further increase its defense spending. So far Bonn has provided for an increase of some 1.5 percent in real terms. The further increase is to be made in a supplementary budget.

It was pointed out that the Federal Government would be fully meeting its NATO commitments in 1980. The Atlantic alliance decided 2 years ago that member countries should increase their defense budgets by 3 percent in real terms. It was emphasized in Bonn that the government had met its commitments throughout the last decade. There was reason to doubt whether other NATO partners would now follow the Federal Republic's example.
According to information available to DPA, the Federal Security Council, a Cabinet committee that meets in secret, has finally decided that the two missile destroyers Emsdetten and Bayern will leave at the end of April, as planned, on a 4-week training voyage to the Indian Ocean. After the events in Afghanistan it was thought that the visit of federal naval ships to ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kenya and India might possibly tend to aggravate the situation in the crisis zones.

SPD ASKS STRAUSS TO EXPLAIN CONTACTS WITH SPANISH, PORTUGUESE RIGHTWING

LD271258 Hamburg DPA in German llll GMT 27 Feb 80 ID

[Text] Bonn--The SPD has called the CSU Chairman Franz-Josef Strauss to publicly explain the alleged contacts and money transfers to rightwing groups in Spain, Portugal and other countries. Referring to a DER SPIEGEL report to this effect, SPD Executive Spokesman Lothar Schwartz stated in Bonn today: "The citizens of our democratic state, which is based on the rule of the law, have a right to know whether politician Strauss, who is a candidate for one of the highest offices of the Federal Republic, has in fact become involved with antidemocratic reactionaries and even provided financial assistance for the achievement of their political goals."

Schwartz said that, contrary to its usual practice in responding to accusations and revelations, the CSU and its chairman has in this case remained silent and so far have refused to answer journalists' questions.

PRESS SCORES THATCHER REMARKS ON EC BUDGET CONTRIBUTION

DW281138 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German to East and West Germany 0605 GMT 27 Feb 80 DW

[Press review on British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's comment on the EC budget]

[Text] NEUVERUHR-ZEITUNG of Essen writes: You can only call it blackmail when Mrs Thatcher lets her partners know through a television interview that she will discontinue British payments to the European Community till if the British contribution is not curtailed in line with her ideas. The European till is not a collection bag where everybody contributes as much as he wants to, and contracts exist with regard to the contributions that are binding on all. This action by the resolute government chief makes it difficult for even benevolent Europeans to side with the British. They need it (the EC). The country is in a catastrophic situation. The economy is on the decline, while unemployment and inflation are shaking the island. In order to get out of that situation the British need the European Community. Will Margaret Thatcher really throw a sinking ship's lifeboats overboard?

The daily DIE WELT comments on the same issue: It could be the beginning of the end for the European Community, said Margaret Thatcher, if her government were to refuse to pay its contribution to the European Community. But the threat was not meant that seriously because the lady, whose shell is probably the most iron thing about her, admitted that in doing this London would be violating a valid right, which she did not want to do. She did not admit, however, that some people on the continent would rather like it if she were to follow up on her strong words--uttered for the sake of domestic British consumption--with action. The suggestion has been heard from Brussels that association ought to be offered to London. Mrs Thatcher will not risk that detachment from Europe despite her irritation over the annual DM4 billion she must pay to the European Community till.
KOELNER STADTANZEIGER notes: The threat of the British prime minister to withhold some of the British contributions to the budget of the European Community hardly seems fit to make Carrington's talks with Schmidt and Genscher more fruitful with regard to alleviation for London. Mrs Thatcher's bold attack can also not be considered a contribution to solidarity in the Western camp in view of the Afghanistan crisis. Mrs Thatcher's action, however, must not be criticized primarily as being an affront against the allies. The prime minister may be concerned most of all about showing a firm stance prior to a no-confidence vote in the House of Commons.

COMMENTATOR LAUDS FRG APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN CRISIS

One can discard Brezhnev's speech on Afghanistan as clumsy propaganda and one will find arguments for doing so. But one can also see a signal in it with which the Kremlin wanted to announce its preparedness for talks. The Federal Government was right in deciding for the second, the more likely interpretation of Brezhnev's words.

One can almost hear the sigh of relief in the initial statements of the federal chancellor and the foreign minister. Helmut Schmidt considers his careful course as confirmed, a course he just described for the first time in public with the words that in critical situations one must give time to the other side--meaning Moscow. In other words, the West ought to give the Soviets time to analyze their own error and to look for a way out of the bind they have created for themselves. Schmidt's coalition partner, Genscher--despite all justified skepticism--sees a glimmer of hope.

Bonn is urging that the two quarreling giants eventually talk to each other again. The disruption in communications between Washington and Moscow has been rightly considered by the federal chancellor and his men as the greatest danger to world peace. Schmidt has purposefully said that a thinking process has now obviously been set forth "also" in Moscow. He seems to be optimistic that this process has been underway for a long time in Washington.

Schmidt is not the only one who sees the absence of cool analysis and rational action in the overly hasty reactions of the U.S. President following the invasion of Afghanistan. But--in addition, the hawks in Moscow have not merely violated international law--dictator Amin whom they overthrew can hardly have asked for their fraternal help--but they miscalculated. The Russians did not expect such a great rejection front in the United Nations, nor did they reckon with such brave, dogged resistance by the Islamic rebels.

To avoid misunderstandings: By their brutal assault the Soviets have played with the fire that might set the world ablaze, intentionally or unintentionally. Yet Washington's power play has not contributed toward reducing the danger of a world conflagration either. In a remarkable analysis the former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, George Kennan, certifies to his government "an alarming lack of equiponderation in the analysis of the problem as well as in the choice of countermeasures."

The Federal Government, in contrast, has behaved in a level-headed way in this precarious situation. It would be unpleasant and irresponsible to fan tension even more. Neither is blind solidarity with Washington necessary in all decisions. Displeasure in Bonn and Paris, but also "imbalanced reactions would not have occurred had Carter consulted with the allies and the governments affected in the Gulf region prior to his Olympic threat and the promulgation of his "doctrine".
It goes without saying that Brezhnev’s words must now be followed by deeds. The most important step would be the resumption of dialog between Washington and Moscow. The main task of the West Europeans, and thus also of Bonn, in this conflict of the world powers can probably be solely to [help] repair the communications line between Moscow and Washington and to fathom how seriously Brezhnev means his words.

In its careful course the Federal Government should not let itself be irritated by pinpricks from the conservative side.

CDU CHAIRMAN KOHL SCORES SCHMIDT, CALLS FOR SOLIDARITY

[Excerpts from reporter Wiedemeyer interview with CDU Chairman Helmut Kohl; date, place not given--recorded]

[Text] [Question] What opportunities do you have as the leader of the opposition in the Bundestag to make the chancellor tell parliament what consequences the Russian assault on Afghanistan will have for German politics and how one ought to handle them?

[Answer] I am in favor of all politically responsible persons, whether in the government or the opposition, reacting in such a situation in a calm, wise, considered manner but also with determination. I regret that since the decisive statements, announcements and actions of the American President many European politicians are dodging the issue. European solidarity with the United States—in order to stress a common voice of freedom—has not been demonstrated in these weeks. That pertains particularly to Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. In short, what European policy has offered in these first weeks of the new year has been shameful.

In some sessions during the coming weeks, we will press to have the government eventually say a word about the situation to the German body politic. Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt keeps quiet because he cannot muster the inner determination to say the right thing at the right time. In the present situation he does not dare do the right thing for us. The right thing to do for us would be— together with our Western friends, especially the Americans—to tell the Soviets clearly, in line with our decision: You must withdraw from Afghanistan as quickly as possible.

[Question] In his speech yesterday Brezhnev did not indicate anything that would make one believe that the Russians will withdraw very soon. How do you assess Brezhnev’s recent statement?

[Answer] This statement indicates a considerable amount of cynicism. It was the Soviet Union that attacked helpless Afghanistan with combat divisions. So it is not a matter of others giving guarantees. But I am in favor of viewing these suggestions within the framework of considerations of the European Community.

[Question] But that certainly was not the signal which Helmut Schmidt was awaiting so eagerly from Moscow.

[Answer] I cannot see any signal.

[Question] The outlines of government policy with regard to the Olympic matters are particularly unclear. What is the opposition’s stance toward boycotting the Olympics once President Carter’s ultimatum has expired?
Our position has not changed on any point. I see no reason to change it, unfortunately. When the Soviet Union attacks a neighboring country, we cannot pretend that it will be possible to open the Olympics of peace during the summer in Moscow in honor of sports. If the free world and particularly the Germans remain quiet here—in spite of the fact that we have the special historical experience gained in this century—especially as quiet as Chancellor Helmut Schmidt remains, we will fail with respect to history.

On Ash Wednesday Franz Josef Strauss again repeated the CDU/CSU offer to cooperate with the government in mastering the world political crisis. Is that actually a realistic perspective in an election year?

I believe that the question of whether we have an election year now or not should not keep us from viewing the world soberly and from making the right decisions. If we must take on more burdens due to some sensible division of labor between the United States and the European states—including the FRG—with regard to humanitarian tasks, infrastructure for Pakistan, help for Turkey and Egypt, strengthening the Bundeswehr—tasks that are urgently necessary—all this will cost money and sacrifices. As a politician one must also have the courage to say in an election year: Look, fellows, we must give some thought to it together in order to see what we can afford. Naturally, together means for me that all factions, the government and the opposition must be prepared to make these sacrifices.

Do you think that the people will understand that? Is it not true that the people are already almost ignoring the dual Afghan-Iranian crisis?

I find that a great number of our fellow citizens are very much concerned about the future. They correctly point out that all improvements of the Federal Republic domestic political structure will be an objective without lasting value if one does not succeed in guaranteeing peace, with freedom and security.

Behind the nagging of the chancellor with regard to the U.S. administration, there might be the intention of recommending mediation between Washington and Moscow. Could we be aiming for something like that?

A glance at German history shows us that twice in this century we have found ourselves in bad situations. The CDU/CSU will not take part in a policy that would bring our people again into such an unprotected political situation in the world and into such danger. We, the Federal Republic of Germany, are a part of the free world. We are a part of the European Community, a part of the NATO alliance. In view of political developments in the world, only the Americans can guarantee that the peace we want for the Federal Republic will be preserved. For me it means clearly that we need close political ties with the United States. We also want to have traditionally close and friendly ties with France. But the sequence in the significance of this partnership is obvious. It begins with the United States.

Next to foreign politics, what will be the central domestic political issue in the forthcoming election campaign?

There will be three significant issues: Clear recognition of the strength of the social market economy. We want to make a new and important beginning in matters of family policy. A third and very important sphere is safeguarding the energy basis of the FRG which means clearly saying "yes" to the necessity of nuclear energy.
[Interview granted by French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in the Paris radio program "1 Hour With the President"—and simultaneously on French television—to Paris radio reporter Christine Ockrent and French television reporter Patrice Duhamel at the Elysée Palace—live]

[Text] [Duhamel] Good evening, Mr President. Mr President, the replies you are going to give tonight and also the explanations on international problems are, I believe, much awaited. First, because since your last television appearance on 31 December many things have happened in the world—in Afghanistan, of course, as everybody knows. But then following on from Afghanistan there has been, in particular, the tension between Washington and Moscow, a tension which is a threat to world peace.

Your replies are much awaited, too, because, in the middle of this storm, this turbulence, France is striving to follow its own original line which, it appears, has not always been well understood in France and abroad. It is for these reasons that we shall question you on international policy.

[Giscard] I want to say to whom I am going to aim the following explanations. I do not intend them for the experts in diplomatic affairs who are following events daily, but to the French men and women who have been working all day, who returned home tonight and who have the wish to understand better the international situation and France's international actions. It is to them that my explanations will be aimed.

[Ockrent] Quite so, Mr President. The French are worried, and for once it is the international situation which worries them. However, France is not directly involved in any of the conflicts which are troubling the world. Is this anxiety of the French people due to dramatization—to which your new year wishes somehow contributed—or is it legitimate?

[Answer] In order to answer your question I shall explain what France's international action consists of. The answer to the question itself, I would say, will be heard throughout this particular program by the television listeners.

When one speaks about France's international action one cannot imagine its objective as being to react to events or to situate ourselves in relation to other powers. France's international action is aimed at achieving objectives which are our own objectives, the objectives of France, and taking into consideration the concept we have regarding our country, of what it is and what it could become. I believe this point to be important so I repeat it; One must not judge France's international action as a mere reaction to events. Therefore, we must remember that it pursues certain objectives. In that respect, the position of the public man, of the government man, is different from that of the commentator.

You have to react to events every day. I, myself, must lead a political action. At the beginning of this present program I want to recall the objectives of France's international action:

First, of course, it is to defend the interests of France and in particular its security. This is obvious, but one must always be aware of it.
Then, it is to try to maintain peace, first of all because France is a peace-loving country which has no territorial claims toward any of its neighbors and which has no imperialistic desires anywhere in the world. It is a country which suffered in its land the ravages of the last world conflicts and which witnessed the birth of these world conflicts and knows before the confrontation proper that there is a certain resignation to the inevitable confrontation. That is why the maintenance of peace always implies action.

The third objective of our policy is to give Europe, that is to the group of European countries, our partners, an influence in world affairs, an influence which Europe had till the last war, and which it lost and which it must find again.

Finally, our fourth objective is to contribute to the organization of the world taking into account the new realities and repairing injustice. The new realities are the emergence of new powers in the world, the importance of nonaligned countries in world politics, the remedying of injustice and the attempt to put right the excessive inequality in the distribution of riches and levels of living standards.

These are the four objectives of French policy which we shall discuss in analyzing the international situation.

[Duhamel] Mr President, in connection with Afghanistan, as well as with Iran incidentally, the question of relations with the United States—the problem of France's place in the Atlantic alliance—is again posed. In the final analysis, isn't it difficult in a time of tension, such as the one we are now living in, to reconcile the fact of belonging to NATO and a will to be independent, and hasn't criticism of the vagueness of the French position stressed these difficulties?

[Answer] No, I do not think so. But here, too, I think there is something that should be clarified, something very clear to me and which I hope will be very clear to the French citizens who are listening to us: France belongs to an alliance. This is not new. It has been a part of this alliance since 1948—that is, successively under the Fourth Republic and under the Fifth Republic. The alliance results from the North Atlantic Treaty and no one has ever called into question participation in this treaty.

Conversely, I think that people seem to have forgotten the subject of this treaty, and for this reason I brought its text here, and I am going to read out its central article—article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The article says that the parties, that is the states which are signatories, agree that an armed attack against one or several of them occurring in Europe or in North America will be considered as an attack directed at all the parties and, consequently, they agree that should such an attack happen, each of them will support the one that is attacked by quickly taking all the actions deemed necessary, including the use of armed forces. This is what France committed itself to in 1948: an alliance, that is, a treaty which defines what France's behavior will be in the event of an armed attack against one or other of the countries of Europe or North America.

Well, today, France will observe this commitment. So, on the one hand, there is an alliance which is put into practice in the case I have mentioned. On the other hand, there is France's independent policy which corresponds to our country's nature and to the will of our people, and it is linked with all the traditions of our history.
You seem to think that there is a contradiction between the fact of belonging to an alliance and following an independent policy, but I shall tell you that this is the whole of France's history. France has belonged to innumerable alliances: to the Italian alliance of old times, the Spanish alliance, the Austrian alliance, the Russian alliance, the Polish alliance and the cordial alliance, that is the Entente cordiale with Great Britain. During this long period of our history, France has always followed an independent policy. Thus the fact of having an independent policy while having subscribed to the provisions of an alliance is France's normal situation. This is not a new situation or an original one. This is our normal situation.

I would add that we have an alliance and that we are following an independent policy, but we also have feelings of solidarity because France is not an anonymous country; it is not a country that has no policy or which is not situated just anywhere. France is, first of all, a Western democracy and France therefore has feelings of solidarity with democratic regimes, the regimes of freedom in the world and in particular, of course, the Western democracies in America and Europe and also the democracies of freedom wherever they exist in Latin America, in Africa or Asia.

We have a second solidarity: a geographical solidarity with the countries of Europe, so we have a geographical solidarity with our partners. And we have a third solidarity, which is historical and cultural. France has ties with a certain number of countries in the world, either countries that speak its language or countries that belong as it does to the Latin tradition, or countries with which we had links in the past. We intend to feel and demonstrate this solidarity, in particular toward the countries of Africa to which we intend to lend our contribution for their development and for their stability.

So you see, the situation of France's international action is that of a country which has an alliance, which conducts an independent policy, and which has feelings of solidarity. But then some people will say: All this is too much; all this is hazy. Well, these people do not understand what the requirements of an independent policy are because, in fact, the simplest thing is alinement. If France alined itself with the policy of this or that country, our policy would be simple. It would be simple, but France would cease to exist because it would become from the external point of view the province of a superpower. However, this is not what our history teaches us; this is not what our people want. They want us at one and the same time to be faithful to our alliance—and we are—and to conduct an independent French policy while respecting our solidarities.

[Ockrent] But are not Afghanistan and Iran two cases, even if they are outside the geographical context which you just mentioned, where solidarity within the Atlantic alliance could have been more immediate on the part of France? After all, when General de Gaulle declared himself on the side of the United States during the Cuban missile crisis, Cuba was no longer in the territory described by the North Atlantic Treaty.

[Answer] I do not want to make a comparison between situations which are separated by time and are very different. You will remember that in Cuba it was a matter of installing bases, of missiles directed against U.S. territory and in direct proximity to the United States. So that is a completely different situation from the situation you have noted in Iran and Afghanistan.

But since you have asked me about Afghanistan, I should like to explain to you what France's action has been—action which has been constant throughout and which has not varied.
It consisted firstly in saying what we thought of what had happened in Afghanistan: that is, the intervention of Soviet Armed Forces. And we said that we deemed that intervention to be unacceptable. The word unacceptable has a very precise meaning, that is to say, it is a situation which cannot be accepted, which means that we do not accept the fait accompli in Afghanistan. So our aim from the outset has been to seek the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

Now have we acted to achieve this? First, by participating in the formulation of the very broad stand of the international community on this matter. We voted in the United Nations with a majority which, as you know, was bigger than foreseen in favor of the resolution calling for the forces to be withdrawn.

I was able to establish with the prime minister of the most important nonaligned country, India, a joint declaration saying the same thing. We were also able to establish a joint declaration with our prime partner, that is to say with the FRG, which we signed in this room. So we defined our aim very clearly. It was to obtain the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

[Duhamel] You have been reproached by some people for not doing it with the necessary force and for having done it somewhat late.

[Answer] Listen, we'll come back to that. France does not practice a stage-show policy, which means that I do not think that diplomatic action consists in multiplying (passionate) and startling announcements.

You will recall that there are in the world today many public figures who are indeed making startling announcements and to which we--and you--do not attribute much importance. That is not what action should be judged by. That is not the image that should be given of the French head of state.

So I return to the (first question), which is: Is the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan a realistic solution which can be envisaged? Well, I will tell you that this is not a matter of finding a new solution to the problem. It is a matter of bringing back a situation which existed before, because Afghanistan is a country which was able to live for a long time, in particular during the whole of the last war and during the entire period of the cold war, without experiencing external intervention and without constituting a threat to neighboring states. Nobody said that Afghanistan from 1945 to the 1970's--throughout the times of international tension--was a threat to neighboring states. Its situation was considered in the region to be satisfactory by all its partners. So it is a matter of reestablishing a situation which existed before. And since it existed before, it should not be unattainable. This situation should, in my view, have three aspects. The first aspect is the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Afghanistan.

The second aspect is the right of the Afghans to decide their affairs for themselves. This is a universal right, which is particularly justified for a people which has an ancient and courageous tradition of independence, for a people which is a Muslim people and which therefore shares the worsening sensitivity in motion in the Muslim world.

The third aspect of this situation is the fact that Afghanistan should not constitute a threat to its neighbors, and guaranteeing in particular that it cannot be the stake of the instrument of rivalry between the superpowers.

These are the three aspects which we should seek in order to reestablish the situation in Afghanistan. Well, it is obvious that it is by leaving open the means of communication with the main parties concerned, particularly with the Soviet Union, that one can measure the possibility of finding the bases for such a solution.
France seems to remain the only country observing the cult of detente. Regarding Afghanistan, would it not be the moment to define that for Moscow, detente is a screen to hide Soviet expansionism?

First, I believe that the word is causing surprise because detente describes situations where international situations are improving. But currently the international situation has become more tense, and for this reason I would talk rather about cooperation for peace, or a coordinated effort toward peace.

There is no longer talk of detente?

At present the word does not describe the situation exactly but on the other hand, must one judge detente negatively? First of all we (must not see) detente as some represent it, namely that we should offer the opportunity for unilateral gains or unilateral advantages for the partners of detente. This is not our way of seeing it, and we have always considered, I consider, that the advantages of detente must of course be reciprocal. If we observe the results of this policy of detente, in whose origin France played an important part, we see first of all that it has been contributing for 15 years now to the maintenance of peace. As I think of the 15 years that preceded the war of 1914, the 15 years that preceded the war of 1939, I think that a policy that has been able to preserve a peaceful situation in an excessively armed world and among strong ideological confrontations is a policy that has made a positive contribution. This policy of detente has allowed a modification of relations between the European countries.

Thus, relations between France and certain European countries—I am thinking of Poland, of Romania, of Hungary, and recently, I think of East Germany—have become transformed, have been accentuated. They have certainly modified the situation in Europe. I tell you, for the benefit of those who talk so willingly about giving up detente, that this would plunge some European countries' peoples into despair, those who are our partners in the quest for detente.

Finally, I observe that during this period, bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and France have conserved a positive character. So, here is the judgement I make of this policy of detente. What is true is that detente, and I said this you will remember in Moscow, requires confidence, or a climate of confidence. As soon as tension mounts, the nature of the policy of detente becomes more demanding, particularly in the field of security. For this reason, at present, security requirements must be measured with much more attention and vigilance than they were during the previous phase of detente.

A few days ago, Mr Brezhnev spoke about the possibility of withdrawing Soviet forces if the integrity of Afghanistan is guaranteed. Do you see here a sign of an evolution, of an overture by Moscow, or do you think, on the contrary, do you fear that the Soviets may yet go further, toward Pakistan for example?

It would be levity on my part to make such a judgement during a mere conversation. I told you that the action of France consists in exploring this avenue, that is to see whether there is indeed a Soviet desire to seek a formula leading to the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan. Just now I was recalling the three terms of this solution, that is, on the one hand the withdrawal of the forces, then the right of the Afghans to choose what they want to do and then the problem of the security of the neighboring countries and the manner of guaranteeing that Afghanistan should not be at stake in the rivalry between superpowers.

President Tito will possibly not survive tonight. Do you think that Yugoslavia and the Balkans as a whole could again become an area of destabilization, this time of destabilization in Europe?
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[Answer] No.

[Duhamel] Afghanistan: This has been discussed for 2 months now. The present program is taking place 2 months to the day after the Soviet intervention in Kabul. There were a series of ripostes and answers, the one most talked about which public opinion [words indistinct] is interested in is undoubtedly the problem of the boycott of the Olympic games. What is France's position today?

[Answer] France has not changed its position. France, from the very beginning has considered that participation in the Olympic games was to be decided by the Olympic organizations themselves. It is the Olympic organizations which will decide.

[Text] [Ockrent] Were there any divergencies with Washington, regarding reaction on Afghanistan? Are there any today?

[Answer] I answer gladly. This is one of the subjects on which a lot was written and said. I was saying just now that France was leading an independent policy. If a policy is independent it is clear that it is not identical with that of its various partners. Regarding reaction to the events in Afghanistan, I will say there are no divergencies in the analysis of events. Our analysis of the conditions in which these events occurred is quite close. There are no differences as to the objective—to obtain the withdrawal of the intervention forces in Afghanistan. But there are differences about the choice of means to achieve this objective.

[Duhamel] Do you think in terms of food sanctions, or boycott of the Olympic games, or....

[Answer] Regarding the boycott of the Olympic games, I say this: France has not criticized the decisions taken by the United States to reestablish their power because I consider that world peace is all the better guaranteed if there is no weakness on the part of a superpower, especially if this particular superpower is our ally. Therefore there has been no criticism of actions to reestablish the power of the United States. The difference lies in the fact that one must seek conditions in which the Soviet Union could be led to decide to withdraw its forces. On the manner in which such conditions could be created there have indeed been different viewpoints.

[Ockrent] In case of direct confrontation between Moscow and Washington, as is the case now, and this suggests a third way which seems to be the French calling, is this a neutralistic absurdity of which the American ambassador to France spoke recently?

[Answer] The heads of state do not entertain polemics with ambassadors. However, the existence of not a third way, but of other ways, means simply that there are countries in the world which carry out an independent policy. There is not only the way of France but that of India, that of Federal Germany—which on certain issues has taken an attitude close to ours—and then there is the way of other countries whom one can hear expressing themselves in different manners. The neutralizing you are hinting at is the fact of France renouncing its alliance or denouncing its alliance. This has never been under question. On the contrary, having only one alliance France will continue to carry out an independent policy. I say to you that it is neither pressure nor intimidation which will make us change direction.

[Duhamel] Regarding Europe, 2 months ago [as heard] the French-German declaration was made here with Helmut Schmidt. There was a meeting of foreign ministers in Rome. The Nine have expressed themselves. In your view, what does Europe lack now in order to have weight in the international balance?
[Answer] I think it has started to weigh more in the international balance. I think that our objective is to wipe out the ruins which the war left in Europe. I do not speak of the actual ruins which, luckily, are almost completely cleared. But I am speaking of the political ruins which the war inflicted on Europe by wiping away in one blow a large part of its influence or of its means of activation. One must rebuild this European influence in the world. We shall reconstitute it not through machinery but through active political cooperation.

It is important to note that on important points, and in particular in the search for a solution to the Afghan crisis, we managed to reach joint arrangements. I attach great importance to the joint French-German declaration which, in my view, is a landmark in the reemergence of Europe as a new center of influence and decisions in the world. I note that despite the pessimistic prognostics put forward by some, the leaders of Federal Germany have in essence kept to the terms of the declaration.

[Ockrent] Europe is not just Paris and Bonn. So can one make a Europe without the other members of the Community and in particular without Great Britain, which more than ever seems to impede pan-European action?

[Answer] I told you earlier that the fact of rendering to Europe its influence on world problems naturally interested all our partners. And in the forefront of our partners there is our first partner: the FRG.

You hint at the present difficulties at the European level—which will be brought up during the forthcoming European Council, since a number of problems will be introduced there. The only thing I would like to tell you this evening is that it is inconceivable that a solution should be found for these problems that does not cover all these problems simultaneously. There is, as you know, the problem of fixing agricultural prices for the forthcoming period, there are some important problems involving sectors of economic life, namely the lamb problem, the fishing problem, and the demand by Britain for a modification of the agreement which it signed concerning its contribution to the EEC budget.

Well, I say that it is not possible to seek a solution to just one of these issues, but that all of them must be solved if France is to accept such a solution.

[Ockrent] Crises are multiplying in the world: They are upsetting the rules of the game which, since the Yalta meeting, have not changed much. Is this the moment for inventing new concepts, new mechanisms? Can France really make a contribution?

[Answer] Yes. France is making an active contribution. I would say that everything I have told you since the start of this program shows that France has its own voice, a national voice on the subject of its international action. This means first that it believes that it is very important to have regional organizations in this new world which is in the process of being organized--regional organizations of which Europe is a good example.

On the other hand, I think it is essential to tackle the problems at the base of the real tensions in the world. The tensions in the world are not disputes between heads of state. It is a fact that there are opposing forces. There is the fact that people do not acknowledge the right which certain new powers have to manifest themselves, or to act.

There is also the fact that there are great injustices in the current world as far as the division of wealth is concerned. That is why, in my opinion, the most important diplomatic initiative which has been taken in recent years was taken by France, and that is the North-South dialog. If you leave our country and if you meet the leaders of the Third World, there is not one of them who will not speak to you about the prospects or possibilities which were opened up by the North-South dialog.
Earlier on you spoke of your trip to India and the very important problem of the nonaligned movement. Does France intend, as certain people have stated, to lean toward the nonaligned movement within the framework of these new rules of the international game?

No. I think that would be quite a mistake. France belongs to an alliance— as I have reminded you—but although it belongs to an alliance, it is not aligned—it cannot belong to the nonaligned movement. On the other hand, it can consider the importance of this nonaligned movement. I can tell you that when I had the talks with Indian Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi—to which you referred—I did not in any way push her or seek to convince her to aline herself. On the contrary, I told her of the importance for the world in there being big nonaligned countries, since in my opinion this is a factor of equilibrium for the world and it is a guarantee for peace.

The idea (toward which we are pushed) and at the beginning of our conversation you asked questions which showed that certain people finally (support) the idea of alinement in the world in two blocs according to the affinities which each side feels. It is an idea which would be very dangerous for equilibrium and peace in the world. I am convinced that a world in which there is a certain diversity of attitudes and situations is a world in which crises have a better chance of being solved. If there are only two blocs, they are led by the logic of their forces toward a confrontation, which is much more difficult to dominate.

I did not tell you earlier on—on the subject of peace—that the risks of confrontation would weigh on the whole of humanity and would bear no comparison with the previous frightening world conflicts. Thus one of the essential roles of heads of state at the present time is to know how to get over crises, that is to say to know how to find peaceful outcomes to crises. Naturally.... [Ockrent interrupts]

The sangfroid of some.... [Giscard interrupts]

Yes. (With) sangfroid but without renouncing—and this is the difficulty—the fundamental principles. And that is why when I spoke to you about Afghanistan I reminded you of the first two basic principles: the withdrawal of forces and the right of the Afghans to decide what they want to do.

Among other things that agitate the world there are forces which are emerging, like religion and in particular Islam. Is Islam a tidal wave which has already swept away, which is going to sweep away on its course all the rules known so far in international relations?

No, I do not think so. Islam is a religion practiced by a great number of people in vast regions of the world, and there is indeed a revival of the Islamic faith. This is an important event in our world which France sees and observes, and France considers that it is perfectly legitimate on the part of those who practice this faith.

Mr President, you have just mentioned destabilization in Central Asia regarding of course Afghanistan, but there are other seats of tensions, particularly in Africa. About 1 month ago France had to intervene in Tunisia, it had to extend aid to Tunisia. During the last few months or years there have been, with different contexts and conditions, interventions in Zaire, in Central Africa, in Mauritania and in Chad. First, isn’t there a danger of escalation in this intervention process, and what are the true criteria for intervention? From what moment does France decide to aid an African country?
First, I want to rectify a point right away. France has not at all intervened in Tunisia. France has simply lent means of transport to the Tunisian Government, which had to settle a problem on its own territory, and which has needed such facilities. But there has been no military action by France in Tunisia. And my objective, which I expressed repeatedly when I went to this country, is to see the Mediterranean become a lake of peace and stability. France wishes that the ensemble of the Mediterranean countries share this objective of peace and stability in the Mediterranean.

You speak about other actions in Africa, the most striking of which was in Shaba. Well, I remind you what happened in Shaba: Elements came from outside the country and the Zairian Government appealed for international solidarity, and France in fact sent in a unit, a known unit of 800 men. It left on 19 May 1978 and returned home 16 days later. If you compare these dates to those of Afghanistan, for example, it would mean that the Soviet forces should have withdrawn from Afghanistan on 12 January. During this intervention the French forces never met with any hostility or even reserve on the part of the population or any local authorities.

In fact, France's intention regarding Africa was not at all of an imperialist character. It is absurd to make such a suggestion. If France had wished to be imperialist, it would have conserved its positions. Through the wisdom of my predecessors, France, on the contrary, led these states to independence. France's aim is to assure that the neighboring continent, which is a friendly continent, is stable and devoted to the development task in peace. For this reason, France reacts to the attempts to destabilize Africa. As you have seen, these attempts have always been inspired from outside the country.

Naturally, some of our actions have been criticized in general. You have seen this, haven't you? But I think about what the state of mind, the anxiety of the French people would be one day—you spoke about anxiety earlier on—if we had in front of us a destabilized neighboring continent, as seen in this or that region in Asia. What then would be the daily attitude of the French? They would regret the passing of the period when France was capable of contributing to the maintenance of the stability of Africa.

But in this case is France playing the role of the Cubans in the West, or is it just defending specific interests which may involve oil transport routes, that is to the Persian Gulf where it might become a sort of gendarme?

No, if France has intervened, it has not intervened on somebody else's behalf as you suggested. France intervened in order to help friendly countries fight destabilization attempts. France on its part acts in such a way as to enable these countries to recover and secure their stability themselves as soon as possible. I stress that with regard to Tunisia, for instance, there are no longer any transport means there, and there are no naval units off this country.

Does France possess the means for its policies? You have often said that the defense portion of the national budget should be increased, but do we really have the means to develop at the same time nuclear forces, forces for intervention abroad and the regular army?

You ask a question about our defense means. First observation: Of all the Western countries—United States, FRG, Great Britain—France is the only one that has for 5 years been regularly increasing part of its military expenditure in both its budget and in its gross domestic product, in its national resources. Between 1974, that is the budget worked out before my election, and 1980, the portion of military expenditures for the defense of France in the gross domestic product rose from 3.37 percent to 3.60 percent this year. All the military know this well. Therefore, of all the Western countries, France is the one that has imposed upon itself the most regular, the most consistent defense effort.
This is shown by the volume of our defense means. In 1974 the French deterrent force was capable of using a nuclear power of 20 megatons. I apologize for these technical figures. Twenty megatons represents about 1,000 times the Hiroshima bomb. This is not pleasant either for the mind or the heart but it gives one an idea about the importance of our means. In 1974 it was 20 megatons and in 1980 it is 50. It is at the level of 75 megatons, and in 1985 we will reach 90 megatons. In other words, presently we are the third nuclear power in the world, and it is recognized as such.

Now, what are the problems of the future of our defense? First, to insure that our deterrent force remains deterrent, and one should at every moment, both in connection with the technical aspect and volume, insure that our deterrent force remains deterrent because it is the ultimate security of France. At the same time, we shall have to make decisions. Decisions concerning our defense have been made until 1990. I will not go into details, but we shall then have to prepare the security of France beyond 1990. This is a job to be done by technicians, by the General Staff, but the government and I will have to examine the situation next summer. Naturally I and the government will report to you.

Finally, the third aspect. Alongside these nuclear forces France needs diversified forces so as to be able to face various world situations. You have just mentioned Afghanistan and Africa. You could have mentioned the Horn of Africa and the fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia. Nowhere (in these places) has there been the use or threat of using nuclear weapons. And in Asia, despite the fact that the USSR is a great nuclear power, no one mentioned the use of nuclear weapons. There are varying situations in the world, and if France wants to guarantee the various aspects of its security, the approaches to its territory, the protection of its overseas departments and territories, or the approaches to its essential supplies, then it should have diversified forces.

[Duhamel] If I have understood well there is no question, for example, of getting closer to an all-nuclear policy at the military level? Is this an idea currently being discussed?

[Answer] That is what it is called but one does not know if it is really being proposed. But an all-nuclear policy would mean that France would prohibit itself from handling certain security problems if these security problems could not be covered by the nuclear arrangements. (I would point out to you) that firstly, this is the case, for example, for all the problems of our supplies and for conflicts in which nuclear armaments are not usable.

[Duhamel] Mr President, this international situation about which we have been speaking for roughly 40 minutes occupies the main part of the political debate today. As everyone has noted, I think that everyone also notes that, with the exception of the Communist Party of course, there is what is a bit barbarically called a consensus in the political world. I would like to know if, in your opinion, this consensus, this agreement, is focused simply on the analysis, that is, on the criticism of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, or also on the solutions and on France's external and worldwide action

[Answer] I think that a consensus does in fact exist, and you said with the exception of the Communist Party. I will be more precise than you and say with the exception perhaps of the Communist leaders, since doubtless among those who vote for the Communist Party a certain number share what we have just described. The consensus is basically a consensus on France's independent policy and action, action for peace, action in solidarity with our partners, but with proper objectives. And I am glad that this consensus exists.
I am not glad for my own sake. I do not intend to take any personal advantage from it, but it strengthens France’s possibility of action and her authority. But naturally there are critics of certain details, that goes without saying. But as for the analysis and the essential direction, I consider that at the present time a very large proportion of French public opinion and its leaders approve the action which is being taken.

[Duhamel] You talked just now of the attitude of the Communist leaders. Has their attitude surprised or shocked you over the last few months?

[Answer] I do not want to comment on the attitude of the leaders of any political party.

[Ockrent] But the isolation of the Communist Party, this electoral tactic of isolation, could you not turn out to be the main beneficiary of it?

[Answer] I do not concern myself with this question. I conduct France’s international affairs. Leaders of political parties conduct their parties’ affairs.

[Ockrent] Added to international tensions are of course the French people’s preoccupations with economic and social problems. How far can one say, from the point of view of purchasing power or unemployment, to name just two problems, that international factors really play a decisive role?

[Answer] At present in French people’s preoccupations, economic and social preoccupations link up with international preoccupations, and today it was intended only to deal with aspects of the international situation and actions, and that is why we shall only deal with these problems. I intend to deal with the others during my next talk. There is another circumstance which makes it impossible for me to deal with them today, and that is that there is a debate on a motion of censure in parliament which covers precisely these matters, and so it is not suitable for the president of the republic to debate these problems at a time when the parliament itself is in the process of discussing them.

But I will say that indeed these events have very serious consequences on the economic and social level, consequences for two reasons. The first reason is obviously the increase in the price of oil, with all that entails, since you know that now our oil bill this year will represent almost as much, not entirely but almost as much, as the total income tax paid by the French people. That is as if they were paying two taxes on their income, one budget which we use for our expenditure, and then another, the same, since it is used externally, abroad. So this increase obviously has considerable consequences.

The second consequence is that international concern is always a factor of additional difficulty, since concern slows down investment, makes economic decisions more uncertain, and thus affects the level of investment and the level of unemployment. That is why these consequences are serious, and why they must be taken seriously. The latest developments are quite recent. These are the latest rise in oil prices, international tension since the end of December, and naturally the government will have to act to insure that economic policy takes into account these new developments. That is why economic and social policy in 1980 should be particularly active.

[Duhamel] Mr President, I think that today in every country and in the foreign policy of every power there is a moral dimension, and the Sakharov case in particular has recently brought up in a fairly loud and also spectacular way the problem of human rights. There are also the words and actions of France on human rights. How is it acting?
[Answer] I think.... I do not want to seem to give a eulogy on what we are doing, I prefer to tell you what we are doing, and you can judge. France, of all the countries in the world, is probably the one which has done the most for human rights. Some examples: We have at present in France 150,000 political refugees who are the daily witnesses of our action in favor of human rights. As far as Latin American countries are concerned, France has taken 6,400 political refugees from Latin America. That is, we are the leading country in Europe for taking in political refugees from Latin America. If you take Southeast Asia, we have taken 75,400 refugees from Indochina, 75,400 at present—that is to say three times as many as all the European countries together.

If you now take individual cases, we have not stopped trying to ensure that people who are in prison or being mistreated can leave their country and be received in ours. These are some examples: When I was elected president of the republic, there were numerous Frenchmen who were imprisoned in Guinea. Thanks to the reestablishment of our relations with President Sekou Toure, there are no more French political prisoners in Guinea. I was able to be present a few days ago at the dissolution of the association of relatives of those interned in the country. Another example: In a few days, thanks also to persistent action, the last Frenchmen detained in Uruguay will be returning to our country. I received an assurance about this a few days ago. As far as other countries are concerned we have intervened on every occasion, and on every occasion we have obtained a certain number of results.

[Ockrent] In Argentina as well?

[Answer] In Argentina also. But if one day the list is drawn up of human rights cases which have been negotiated and solved by leaders of countries, I think I can say without fear of contradiction that it will turn out that it was action by France which will have achieved the biggest number of results concerning action for human rights.

[Ockrent] You have explained to us in broad terms France’s foreign policy, and of course there are many many more things to say. But after 6 years of personal conduct of French foreign affairs do you think that French foreign policy is affecting the course of things? What are its defects and its trumps?

[Answer] When you said personal action, you meant personal experience, because France’s international action is a collective work. The president of the republic has, of course, his responsibility, and the government has its own, and then all those who live abroad or who have connections abroad also have their own contribution.

I think it should be known, French people should know that France has trumps, because in their difficulties in sometimes understanding France’s international action. There are two fundamental difficulties. The first which we talked about at the beginning is that of not perceiving the fact that France is conducting an independent foreign policy, and that it is, of course, less easy to conduct an independent foreign policy, it is less simple. It is less black and white than if one conducts a policy of alignment. And they should be reminded that what they want is precisely for France to conduct an independent policy.

The second difficulty is that they will ask whether France basically has the means in today’s world. That’s what you just said, isn’t it, to influence events? Well, I think France has the means. I tell you that after several years of observation and direct experience France has the means, for a number of reasons which I will list. Firstly, because France has a tradition of influence in the world. This is due to the heads of state who have followed one another. It is due to the attitude of the French people who have launched very strong ideas into the world, whose echo still reverberates, and to the fact that we still have historical attributes of influence.
For example, we are a permanent member of the Security Council. We were presiding, you know, during the last debates. We are among the four powers which are watching over the fate of Berlin, where I went, incidentally, in October. We are a nuclear power, in civil and military terms the third in the world it can be said.

We are an economic power, not at a level which I deem desirable—we still have, to be sure, to make progress in this area—but we are the third exporter in the world, and therefore an economic power capable of making a contribution to the solution of economic and social problems. Last, we have a major influence in Europe. So all this gives much means of influence. And that is why, I think, that France has the capacity to affect events.

To return to my remark at the beginning, it has the ability to act, it must have the will to act, and it must act itself. Because there is no point in having the means but not the will to act, or if one does act simply to rally to or to support the action of others. That is why there is a cohesion in all this. That is why France is able to conduct international action; it must have the will to do it, and it must conduct it itself, that is pursuing its concepts and pursuing its interests, in order to make its own contribution to peace and security in the world.

[Duhamel] Thank you for answering our questions.

MITTERRAND ON FOREIGN POLICY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ISSUES

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[Claude Vincent interview with Socialist Party First Secretary Francois Mitterrand: "The PCF Cannot Take the Risk of Allowing the Socialist Candidate To Be Defeated in 1981"—date, place not specified]

[Excerpt] Claude Vincent: First Secretary, many French people feel that the threat of war has grown more serious recently. I would like to ask you whether you feel the same way and what you think of France's attitude in this crisis.

Francois Mitterrand: I do not believe that there will be a war between the superpowers, which are capable of destroying each other. At least not yet. However, if it lasts, the present tension could take the form of localized wars which, of course, will not be localized for those affected by them. This is possible at any time. However, a generalized nuclear war in which France would be involved does not strike me as probable at the moment. I think that the margin which exists between war and the present crisis is still big enough to leave room for a number of intermediate states which are neither peace nor war. These states are dangerous because, unless care is taken, they could get out of control and spark off a catastrophe. Remember Sarajevo. That is why our role is to seek ways to peace wherever we can, without however accepting shameful compromises which merely bring about war more quickly with loss of dignity. It is not easy!

No Pershing or SS-20 Missiles

What do I think of the French Government's position? Our policy is implemented within narrow limits. France must not act as or give the appearance of being the world's gendarme. No country is capable of being the world's gendarme aside from the USSR and the United States, and they can only assume this role if they reach agreement and reconcile their interests. We have still not yet reached that point. However, I must stress that neither side is prepared to fight. They advance and then withdraw. There is no decisive battle. [paragraph continues]
Neither side is capable of checkmating the other in this game of chess. They merely
take the castle or bishop. Each side meanwhile takes what advantages it can. It is
reasonable that France should be able to keep its distance from this game, in which
it is not involved. However, we must not forget that we have the advantage of law and
a particular concept of civilization. Upholding the law counts when you appeal to the
universal conscience—the consciences of billions of human beings who would be victims
of a confrontation between the powers. From this viewpoint the president of the republic
can be criticized for being slow in reacting to the Kabul coup, caught as he was in the
many conflicting areas of prudence in his foreign and domestic policies.

France has unfortunately been absent from the right camp for 2 weeks making do simply
with being a country skilled in maneuvering through the difficult terrain. Nothing
more than that.

Claude Vincent: Would you have liked a quicker reaction?

François Mitterrand: As I said at the time, I found the president’s first excessively
alarmist speech and the foreign minister’s excessively opportunist speech both quite
inappropriate. What a lot of statements all rolled into one! A sigh for Carter, an-
other for Brezhnev and a third for Schmidt. What are we to think of the Schmidt-Discard
communique? I said that French policy is “cautious.”

Claude Vincent: First Secretary, you referred to the invasion of Afghanistan and also
to the deployment of Pershing missiles which, as I understand it, you support to some
extent.

François Mitterrand: The deployment of the Pershing missiles is the result of a situ-
ation which has been accentuated by the buildup of Soviet so-called conventional forces
in Europe and the recent deployment of the SS-20 missiles. Our country is not a NATO
member. We were not consulted. There was no reason for consulting us. However, if
we had been a NATO member, what would we have done?

My viewpoint is as follows: By some convention of terminology the SS-20’s are called
tactical missiles and the Pershings are called strategic. This is experts’ terminology
irresponsibly adopted by a large number of French politicians. In simple terms a stra-
tegic missile is one which covers 5,000-6,000 km and can cross the Atlantic, while a
tactical missile is one which only covers 1,500-2,000 km. That is an approximate de-
definition. We French are within the radius of action of all these missiles, whether
they are tactical or strategic. We are told that the American Pershing strategic
missiles can hit Moscow in 6 minutes now that they are stationed in Germany, while the
Russian strategic missiles will still take 30 minutes to blow up New York. That may
be: In this respect I understand the Soviet anxiety, but first I urge the French people
to be worried, since Paris is within range of both missiles. What I want is neither
Pershings nor SS-20’s.

Neutralism for Domestic Consumption

That is why I, together with my friends, decided that we should not involve the Socialist
Party [PS] in the protest organized by the PCP against the Pershing missiles alone. It
is quite a different matter to say that I approve of these missiles. I deplore the fact
that I cannot protest. We must revive the campaigns for the dissolution of the two blocs,
for disarmament, for nuclear nonproliferation, for collective security in Europe, in
short, we must place the problem in the correct context.
Claude Vincent: Some people, especially the Communists, accuse the government of allying with U.S. positions, and on other occasions France is criticized for having a lukewarm attitude to its allies. Does your own criticism—that the government reacted rather slowly—not include this reproach that we are rather reticent allies?

François Mitterrand: Some people might tell me that this "cautious" policy is wise. It is a way of avoiding problems. However, the way in which this policy is now being implemented will eventually have the result of inspiring confidence in no one. The president of the republic is psychologically exploiting events over which he has no control. He is tackling peace and war in the same way as he is tackling unemployment and inflation in France. He is not really influencing them, but he is nonetheless carried along by them. He is like a dancer on an elephant's back.

Claude Vincent: Do you think that the positions adopted by France in the international sphere reflect domestic policy concerns?

François Mitterrand: Yes, I think so.

Claude Vincent: Can you explain that?

François Mitterrand: It is simple. The president of the republic thinks that he can neutralize a section of the left by adopting positions which reassure the Soviet Union and consequently the PCF leaders. He does not need to try too hard, since that happened automatically in 1974 and 1978. You might wonder why he bothers since this does not worry the Americans, who are well aware that fundamentally Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s capers keep within the circle agreed by the Atlantic allies. I said on television that if you needed a certificate of approval from Washington or Moscow to be president I would certainly not be president. If it meant anything, you could define Giscard d’Estaing’s foreign policy as a neutralist policy combined with the nuclear bomb, but it means nothing. Giscard’s real foreign policy is Atlanticist. Neutralism is for domestic consumption.

Claude Vincent: Is the PS leader not tempted by a little nonalignment?

François Mitterrand: Nonalignment is something different. A real North-South policy, a real policy for combating hunger, a real international monetary policy depend on a certain view of nonalignment. Ability is not enough.

France’s Independence

Claude Vincent: It might be regarded as a quality in diplomacy?

François Mitterrand: The head of state is an able man and has other qualities: Why should I deny it?

Claude Vincent: First Secretary, many statements have been made on the subject of defense, including Mr Chirac’s proposal that we should increase our nuclear deterrent force by considerably increasing the number of submarines. What do you think of that?

François Mitterrand: France’s independence does not simply depend on the number of nuclear submarines it has but also on logistics, telecommunications, supplies and possession of raw materials. We are far from being adequate in these spheres. However, French independence also depends on autonomous industry, leading research and advanced technology. It is pointless to talk of national independence while agreeing to the kind of international division of labor and production imposed on France by big capital, but unfortunately that is what the president of the republic is doing.
Claude Vincent: Our deterrent can work.

François Mitterrand: Yes, provided that it follows the scientific and industrial progress made by the main countries possessing nuclear weapons. If we allow ourselves to fall behind we will no longer have any deterrent power! Once you are part of this type of balance of forces, it is impossible to stop halfway. The problem is therefore not just a military one.

Claude Vincent: Do you think that the European political reality could become so strong as to have a common defense system?

François Mitterrand: With Europe as it is, devoid of any political reality, there is no point in talking about a joint army. Indeed, it is dangerous to do so. It is dangerous, above all, for our security. An army which has nuclear weapons cannot be a coalition army. Who would it obey? The real political power, which is not in Europe.

No Compromise

Claude Vincent: First Secretary, let us turn to domestic policy. There has recently been a fundamental modification, in that major alliances have been broken and there are now thought to be four dominant political groups. It is clear that none of them can hope to govern alone. You are no longer a partner in a union comprising two major parties but the leader of a party which is going it alone.

François Mitterrand: We were on our own in 1971. We were alone, facing everybody, in fighting to revive the socialism in which we believe. That is natural. The PS has always taken its own decisions, within the framework of agreements we have signed, of course. It is our determination, our decisions and the strategy they form which have made us what we now are: the party with the biggest following and the most public support.

Claude Vincent: Nonetheless, you once had a strong alliance and could count almost automatically on PCF support. This is no longer the case.

François Mitterrand: Let us look at the past. Your statement gives the impression that the four families to which you refer have just been discovered. We have been saying this for more than 20 years. I refer you to articles and books which I have written and which will show you that I have long been arguing on the basis of the existence of four strong tendencies: a hard-line, really reactionary, conservative group; a more liberal conservative group; the Socialist group; and the Communist group. In addition to all that there is the existence of the class struggle. The two conservative groups are on one side, the Communists and we on the other. In addition, constitutional and electoral procedures have helped to lock the four groups in two camps—first, through the election of the president by universal suffrage, then through the majority vote. Added to social antagonism, these two combined causes have led the political groups to be rigidly organized. Furthermore, on essential issues there can be no compromise between right and left.

Now, with 15 months to go before the presidential election, we are in a transitional phase. Each of these political groups is asserting its rights to existence and victory. Each will have its candidate. However, like it or not there will be a regrouping in the second ballot.

Claude Vincent: This brings us to a constant situation in French politics.
Francois Mitterrand: But the institutions remain the same. There is a contradiction between the need felt by political groups to develop alone and the constraints they must accept if they are to win. The majority system requires coalitions; the presidential election requires that candidates stand down. What will happen? This is the dominant problem for the coming months. In any case, the PS will remain faithful to its vocation, which is first to win over as many French people as possible, starting by rallying the popular forces, and second not to compromise on the changes it proposes.

Constitutional Reforms

Claude Vincent: Do you find the institutions unsuitable to French political reality?

Francois Mitterrand: I believe that proportional representation would correspond to the current needs more closely, and that the Constitution should be revised.

Claude Vincent: Would you vote for proportional representation if it was proposed?

Francois Mitterrand: We proposed it, so we would vote for it. Consider the Fourth Republic, it had both the proportional representation and a weak executive. In other words, it increased the tendency toward fragmentation or splitting up. The Fifth Republic is founded on a strong executive and the majority vote, which increases this strength. In other words, it tends increasingly toward authoritarianism, centralization and personalization. The president's excess of power must now be tempered. Proportional representation could do this, as could the reduction of the presidential term of office to 5 years—an old demand which I defended then and which has fortunately been put forward again recently. I fought a whole campaign on it a short while ago. It was part of the joint program and is in the new Socialist plan. Since the head of state has concentrated the whole executive and more in his hands, he cannot be a judge. The people must judge in his place, and once in 7 years is not enough. The long-foreseen deviation in the present system makes it necessary to plan other constitutional reforms. A republic without a parliament is no longer a republic.

Claude Vincent: Had you been elected president of the republic, do you believe that you would have had too many powers to do what you wanted to do?

Francois Mitterrand: This problem must not be seen in terms of individuals. Yes, I repeat that the president of the republic has too much power—those given him by the law and those he has taken in addition. Parliamentary assemblies have done much in modern history. The principle reforms and great turning points in French public life have most often stemmed from their debates.

A Socialist President...

Claude Vincent: Does that still seem a topical question to you?

Francois Mitterrand: I could be, why not? I would certainly be opposed to the return of an assembly like that which governed from 1947-1958. I simply seek a better balance between the executive and the legislature and, within the executive, between the president and the government (not forgetting the judiciary, which is under the head of state’s thumb, or his secular arm, the radio and television service). Parliament, for its part, is quite adequate. If it is in disarray, everything is being done to increase this. Let me give you an illustration. In the Nièvre they want to shut down the Clamecy-Corbigny railroad. [paragraph continues]
Although we are organizing the struggle, the decision is as good as taken by the French National Railroad Company [SNCF], which says that only a dozen people a day go as far as the end of this line, which therefore has no further reason for existing. But we answer that trains arrive in Corbigny at impossible times, that they are antique, that they are heated badly or not at all. Traveling like that is really unpleasant. With well-heated cars, fast trains, comfortable conditions and practical times it would be quite different. The line would be profitable, the public service assured, the users treated properly and the region's economy served. This is the story of parliament's working conditions. Its morale is low, it seems to be serving no purpose, no one wants to go there, it is badly organized, its sittings are at impossible times, the government ridicules it. Are you surprised that, after this, the institution is breaking up? It is high time to act.

Claude Vincent: Mr First Secretary, I am not going to ask if you are going to be the Socialist Party candidate, but at any event there will surely be a PS candidate. Many people, in the PS and even outside, want it to be you so that the debate on this occasion will be at an appropriate level. But I would simply like to ask you a question which the Socialist candidate will have to answer: "If elected, with whom will he govern, and how?"

François Mitterrand: This Socialist president will not be able to govern with the present majority. He will dissolve the National Assembly elected in 1978. He will then have to await the voter's decision and submit to it, faithfully obeying the injunctions of universal suffrage. Will a rightwing majority emerge from these new elections? This would be the reverse of what the government feared in 1978. A leftwing majority? The problem would be solved. In fact, that majority will only be possible if the left coalition holds up and asserts itself. But let us not go reading tea leaves. To keep to your hypothesis, the certain thing is that this Socialist president will have been elected on Socialist policies. He will personify a great popular movement. Everything will be organized around this new reality.

To Each His Responsibilities

Claude Vincent: Let us suppose a left majority composed of two-thirds Socialists, one-third Communists. Are you not afraid that this might pose problems?

François Mitterrand: Each must take his own responsibilities. A Socialist president and a relative but strong Socialist parliamentary majority would create a situation that everyone would have to take into consideration. For France it would be a chance for genuine change, real progress for freedom. I am waiting to see who will turn it down.

Claude Vincent: Over many years you concluded an alliance with the PCF, supported it, made it viable and even made it prosper. Then there was that split, whose causes were much talked about....

François Mitterrand: Nobody thinks any longer that it was a question of nationalizing subsidiaries: This expression surprises you, does it not? Had you forgotten it? The word "subsidiary" no longer appears in Communist speech. It was a term of convenience, like the others.

Claude Vincent: The 22 September 1977 split occurred on this point.

François Mitterrand: Now it seems to have been national independence, and I do not know what else. The PCF leaders' alternating explanations show clearly that they caused the split.
The Union

Claude Vincent: Leaving aside the PCF retraction, what are the underlying bases of your alliance with the PCF and for the split in that alliance?

François Mitterrand: I have said and explained this a hundred times: The underlying basis of this alliance stems from social considerations. The PS does not accept that the majority of French citizens--be it more than two-thirds of the wage earners, workers, employees and cadres, who themselves represent 80 percent of the active population, those who work and produce, along with people on family-run farms and independent workers--the PS does not accept that those excluded from production, the young women, the unemployed of all ages, that the pensioners on small or average incomes should, because of their trade union and political divisions, be handed over to their class enemy to impose his economic system of alienation and oppression on them.

Communist Volte-face

It would be nonsensical for these dominated socioprofessional strata to surrender their interests into the hands of those who oppose and exploit them merely because their organizations are unable to reach agreement. There is only one solution to all this and it is political--a union. I did not invent the Communist Party. I am not responsible for the fact that until recently it was the main left force and that we in France were on the brink of a situation similar to that prevailing in Italy, with a big communist party and a small socialist party, with a communist party standing alone against conservative forces and with any political alternative ruled out, not to mention any other consequences.

My comrades and I inherited this situation, I told Helmut Schmidt: "Taking into account the German as compared with the French population, if you had 8 million Communist voters, well, you would have either agreed on a joint program or no Social Democrat would have ever become chancellor, and the Social Democratic Party would have never been able to implement its program." The problem we are facing is this: Should we try or not--this is a problem of belief--to transform the economic structures and social conditions now prevailing in France? We believe that we should. Now this is possible only through political action. Therefore, we entered into political negotiations with those who represented, like us, the social strata I am talking about. First of all there was the Communist Party, and we entered into discussions with it. We did this on the basis of a sensible government program which took into account the realities of French society and its capacity for transformation.

Claude Vincent: Nonetheless, there are many other considerations which militate against any cooperation between you and the PCF in the sphere of government.

François Mitterrand: You are aware just as I am of the reasons for the Communist volte-face in 1977. I believe that I have explained them clearly.

Claude Vincent: Very clearly.

François Mitterrand: Similarly, at the time of the two big contests in 1974 and 1978, when the left and the right achieved some 50 percent of the vote each, I neither concealed nor disguised my views: "If the left wins, left parties will participate in the country's government." In 1974 I asked the French people for a lot of things at one and the same time: a leftwing president, a dissolution of the National Assembly elected only 1 year previously, a new majority, a radically different policy and a government in which Communists would participate--something that had not occurred since 1947. And yet all this would have been achieved if there had been a little less talk about the Comoro Islands and Djibouti and a little less interference.
Claude Vincent: How did you yourself assess the risk of having Communist ministers?

Francois Mitterrand: I was mainly concerned about the risk of the right remaining in power!

Claude Vincent: Is that all?

Francois Mitterrand: In 1947, at the beginning of my political life, I was member of a government which contained some Communists. They had been members of the government since 1944, when General de Gaulle invited them to join it.

Claude Vincent: At that time you bore a less direct responsibility for the situation.

Francois Mitterrand: True, but the situation was much more difficult then. The PCF represented 27 percent of the French people and France was still very profoundly traumatized by the events which followed the country's liberation. The PCF controlled several regions of France. At that time it would have been able to cause terrible conflicts within the state if it had wanted to. Furthermore, Stalin was in the background. And yet De Gaulle did just that, did he not?

Claude Vincent: It is difficult to compare the two situations.

Francois Mitterrand: France was weaker, more confused and more divided than it is now. Furthermore, it had just emerged from a world war.

A Government Agreement

Claude Vincent: Do you believe that similar circumstances could arise and that you could achieve power and cooperate with Communists within the government?

Francois Mitterrand: This depends on the prospects for achieving a government agreement. The Socialist Party is willing to discuss such an agreement. However, the Communist leadership's present orientations are inconsistent with such prospects. This is why the Socialists should organize and speak up for the popular movement, engage in combat and mobilize the left around themselves.

The fact that I have fought in support of a union unceasingly and unflinchingly entitles me to say that the Socialist Party will not allow its action to be paralyzed, just because the PCF leadership continues to deny to the masses a union which they desire. We will be more active than ever, wherever the struggle is waged. We will represent the left, fight and be the people's hope. Supporters of the left will abandon those who in fact work for Giscard and will join us. Our Socialist program, which is consistent with the policy determined in 1971, corresponds to their desires.

Claude Vincent: Has it never occurred to you that you could be strong enough to be able to govern the country without the Communists? Just a little further progress would be sufficient to insure that an alliance with the Communists became of secondary importance. You need 35 percent of votes to achieve a parliamentary majority.

Francois Mitterrand: The Socialist Party's position is good in the eyes of public opinion, but we have a long way to go yet. Our supporters represent 25 percent of the population, which makes us the biggest party, and our potential can probably be estimated at some 30 percent. Since we have been denied a union, we will not rule out the possibility of governing the country on our own. [paragraph continues]
However, in a democracy, in order to rule the country on your own--like Kreisky in Austria--you must have either an absolute majority or a strong relative majority. Any minority government can only be a very provisional one. Ask my friend Soares what he thinks on the subject. The broader the union, the more certain will be the success of the undertaking.

Claude Vincent: What many French people cannot understand is that despite this capacity for rallying many people, you have taken the major risk of bringing the Communists to power.

Francois Mitterrand: There you go again: You say "major risk." Those are your words.

Claude Vincent: This is what many people think and many people believe.

Francois Mitterrand: I repeat that what constitutes a major risk is a continuation of the Giscard-Barre policy. But be that as it may, a strong Socialist Party is a precondition of any political hypothesis. Perhaps the Communists signed the joint program in 1972 because they believed that they would dominate us. They shared the right's view with respect to this, but we proved wrong both the right and, probably, the Communist Party analysis by showing that a Socialist Party, reestablished among social strata which it has too often shunned in the past 25 years, represented for the French left an important factor for revival. The Socialist Party needed to gain the left's confidence. In order to achieve this it had to recover its authenticity. This has been done.

I am the leader of a party which has become the first party in France. It has stood the test of the past 2 years without suffering any great damage. Do not forget that even in the 1978 parliamentary election we achieved the best percentage of votes in this kind of election in Socialist Party history. One year later, local elections took place. In the trough of depression and having to contend with internal and external polemics, in short under difficult conditions, we gained a further 160 seats, a considerable number. In the European elections, which were said to be a semi-failure, the left nonetheless secured the majority of seats: 41 seats out of 81--22 seats for the Socialist Party and 19 seats for the PCF.

Like in a Ring

But any young Socialist with idealist and rather euphoric views who has joined a unionist party is bound to sustain a considerable shock when subjected to insults by the leaders of the allied party day after day. Any sincere Socialist is bound to feel confused. He does feel confused and must be understood. And this applies to even a greater degree to voters sympathetic to us. This means that you find yourself in a boxing ring even though what you wanted was to join a good football team. I do not feel "punch-drunk" because I am used to it all and because I never had any illusions, but it must be admitted that something can be said to excuse those who are "punch-drunk." Therefore, the Socialist Party must assert itself quite simply as a realistic party aiming at unity. Yes, first of all it must assert its individuality, as I have been asking it to do for years.

Claude Vincent: Do you believe that the Socialist candidate will be able to persuade the Communist candidate to step down in his favor in 1981?

Francois Mitterrand: I do not believe that the Communist Party leaders can ask the Communist electorate to go back on a historical undertaking which corresponds to its interests and hopes. They could not do this without running the risk of an internal crisis, which would be so grave that they will think twice before taking such a step.
The Socialist Party (PSI) Directorate held a meeting at the Chamber of Deputies today. Giovani Battista Fenu reports:

The PSI Directorate met here at the Chamber of Deputies in the office of the Socialist parliamentarians about 90 minutes ago. So far only foreign policy has been discussed. We have learned an introductory talk by Craxi on international problems was followed by speeches by Riccardo Lombardi, chairman of the Central Committee and by Francesco De Martino.

Craxi listed the names of the PSI delegates to the European socialist parties congress to be held in Luxembourg on 3-4 March and then proposed some points for European socialist parties to follow in the field of peace. These can be summed up as follows:

1. Indignation and condemnation of the bloody repression by the USSR in Afghanistan and further pressure on the Moscow government to declare its readiness to withdraw its troops.
2. Maintain European action toward the United States preventing the policy of retaliations from escalating and thus hindering new possibilities for dialog and negotiations.
3. Maintain economic relations with East Europe with a selective policy which takes into account the economic difficulties of countries like Poland and with a trend toward developing cooperation with other East European countries.
4. Support a possible initiative by the president of the Socialist International with the aim of reopening the dialog.
5. An active policy in the Mediterranean.
6. European policy toward the Third World.
7. The development of relations with China with the expression of a multipolar concept which would guarantee a peaceful balance between the two superpowers.
8. Maintain the awareness of European public opinion to questions concerning the violation of human rights and the rights of peoples.
9. Insist on the resumption of negotiations on nuclear arms in Europe, conventional arms and coordination of the control over nuclear power for civilian use, and on regulating the arms markets.
10. Concerning the Olympic games question, no interruption of sporting activities on the inter-European plane, taking into consideration the universal character of the games, but to insist that the Soviet authorities take meaningful measures to create a suitable atmosphere.

Regarding the question of domestic policy, the evaluation of the Christian Democrat (DC) Congress was proposed by Longo to the lay and Socialist parties. This confirms the assessment of the Central Committee on the function of a government of truce. [passage indistinct] It is understood that the meeting of the PSI Directorate, which is still in progress, could give a definitive evaluation after the session of the DC National Council meeting on 5 March which is to elect a new president and a new secretary.

Secretary Craxi, shortly before the end of the Directorate session, made it clearly understood that the PSI expected the election of a new DC secretary to produce a suitable negotiating partner.

For KCNA coverage of the Italian Communist Party delegation's visit to North Korea, see the North Korea section of the 27 February Asia and Pacific DAILY REPORT.
FOREIGN MINISTER MARCELINO OREJA ADDRESSED THE SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE YESTERDAY ON THE SUBJECT OF OUR COUNTRY'S COOPERATION WITH EQUATORIAL GUINEA, STATING THAT IT DOES NOT WANT TO EXCLUDE OTHER COUNTRIES FROM THIS FIELD. THE MINISTER WAS WELcomed ON THE COMMITTEE'S BEHALF BY SENATE SPEAKER CECILIO VALVERDE AND BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, LUIS MIGUEL ENCISO RECIO.

The minister began his remarks with an exposition in two basic parts, concerning the history and the political situation since the 3 August 1979 military coup which deposed dictator Francisco Mbasie in Equatorial Guinea and the cooperation begun by Spain with the new Equatorial Guinean regime following that date.

Oreja pointed out the complete and utter devastation which Equatorial Guinea suffered under Mbasie's policy of terror, which went hand in hand with a deterioration in relations with Spain, which Spain's top diplomat attributed to the deposed dictator's difficult character and the Spanish administration's failure to carry out the commitments agreed upon following the 1968 independence.

"The suspension of relations prompted in 1976 by Spain's lifting of restrictions on news from Guinea," Oreja pointed out, "did not prevent an attempt to maintain a minimal Spanish representation in that country."

He described the military coup led by the present head of state Col Obiang Nguema as "the logical outcome of a chaotic situation" and pointed out that the new regime's aims were clear from the outset, these being to begin a new historical phase, to eliminate the Mbasie regime, to begin national reconstruction in all fields and to base foreign policy on the principles of peaceful coexistence and the defense of human rights, the UN Charter and signed undertakings.

According to the foreign minister, these objectives are linked with those of Spanish foreign policy, especially the objective of working for a new international economic order by encouraging cooperation.

Challenge to Coordination

With regard to cooperation, Minister Oreja spoke about the Spanish Government's immediate response to the pleas for aid issued by the new Equatorial Guinean regime at its inception.

He said that at first the aid was purely of an emergency nature to help the Guinean population with absolute essentials, and that later cooperation programs were drawn up and are now being actualized.

In this connection he mentioned the various Spanish missions sent to assess the situation in the former colony and the plan to send 250 advisers in various fields at the request of the Equatorial Guinean Government itself, in addition to the 200 already there.

Oreja also discussed the aid in connection with housing, transport, the construction of cooperative stores, and the granting of various aid loans for development, and gave details of aid in various fields.

"This cooperation," he said, "has required a great effort and has presented a challenge to coordination among the Spanish ministries." He stressed the Spanish volunteer workers' great spirit of service in the face of difficulties and dangers.
He denied several times that Spain wants to corner the market in cooperation with Equatorial Guinea.

He also said that Spain's cooperation cannot be based on isolated events, but that it must be continuous and must unite all groups and the entire Spanish people.

Interest of Andean Pact [as published; no subsequent mention of Andean Group]

Once the debate with the members of the Senate committee had begun, Oreja explained that it is not Spain's intention to interfere with or to issue judgments on President Obiang's regime and that therefore he invoked the Equatorial Guinean leader's own remark: to indicate the new regime's democratizing plans. In any case, he said that President Obiang has expressed his desire to lead his country along the path of the observance of freedoms.

He also denied that he had any information enabling him to infer that China's diplomatic representation in Equatorial Guinea indicated any ties with the overthrown Mshe regime and pointed out that in any case China is one of the countries which has cooperated most effectively with Equatorial Guinea.

With regard to the exiles, Oreja said that the Equatorial Guinean Government has announced its desire to repatriate them and that many of them who have settled in Spain do not seem to want to return.

Spain's top diplomat denied that Spain wants to pursue a neocolonialist policy. "Spain's policy," he said, "does not pursue a recolonization, but quite the opposite."

These remarks came in response to Socialist Senator Fernando Moran, who said that Spain is aiming to recolonize Guinea and that the massive and indiscriminate return of Spaniards to Guinea will create privileged influential economic groups and bureaucratic classes.

Situation of "Big Landowners"

The Socialist senator said that the exiles' return will help to prevent this effect and claimed that a free market system would be senseless in Equatorial Guinea because it would be the basis for some form of state capitalism.

Minister Oreja stated that Spain will defend its interests in Guinea and that a policy of good intentions does not imply naivete. He also said that the fishing agreement signed with that country is not designed to secure exclusive fishing rights in Equatorial Guinean waters.

As for President Obiang's pleas to the king during his visit last December and in answer to a question from Senator Armas, Oreja said that these pleas were not the result of pondered requests but the spontaneous expression of a call for urgent help "and therefore," he added, "it would not make sense for Spain to take charge of Equatorial Guinea's budget, as President Obiang requested."

With regard to the Spanish settlers expelled following the independence, the minister said that he knew that the owners of major agricultural estates either had returned or could return and that the only problems concerned small commercial properties, the case of which was being taken up by our embassy in that country.

"I have no information," he said, "concerning the existence of any long list of complaints."

The committee chairman Senator Enciso closed the meeting a few minutes before 1430 after over 2.5 hours in session and, together with the Senate speaker, thanked the foreign minister for his attendance.
The Foreign Office was today trying to establish if Moscow has given the first signs of an early thaw in Britain's relations with the Soviet Union.

This followed a report thought to have its source in Moscow that a new Soviet approach is now being considered.

The Soviets, according to the report, see some merits in Lord Carrington's proposals for a neutral Afghanistan, which could offer the Soviet some security in return for the withdrawal of their troops.

The report quoted sources "close to Mr Brezhnev".

But what puzzled diplomats was the claim that informal messages have been sent to London, which said that the Soviets would not even object if UN troops were stationed in Afghanistan. The Soviet objective was to ensure that Afghanistan was not ruled by an anti-Soviet regime.

The Foreign Office formally denied tonight that any such messages, formal or informal, had been received.

Diplomats were trying to establish if the report misunderstood Soviet intentions, or if it had been floated as a "trial balloon", to see how Western powers would respond.

It was confirmed today that Lord Carrington hopes formally to hand over to the Soviet Union shortly some ideas on how to implement his proposal for a neutral Afghanistan. Consultations are taking place with allies.

But diplomats said it was too early to speculate on whether any of the present moves might save the Olympic games in Moscow.

Source Reportedly Victor Louis
The Foreign Office has not received any messages, formal or informal, from the Kremlin, although it has seen a copy of the original story from Mr Louis.

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**THE FOREIGN OFFICE**

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**PRICE OF LONDON**

We have not yet definitely decided. In the circle of the Nine we are in the middle of talks. The precondition is that Afghanistan will receive neutrality, and that is what it wants, too. This neutrality must be guaranteed for the sake of the security of the Soviet Union, and it must allow the Soviet Union to withdraw.

**Question** But who will guarantee Afghanistan's neutrality?

**Answer** The great powers must do it and the countries from the region. After all, they all have cause to want this; because if the Soviet Union withdraws, everybody will benefit, everybody will be satisfied, the Soviet Union and the neighbors.

**Question** But is getting together with the Soviet Union not the main problem?

**Answer** I think so. We must advance our proposals as soon as possible, and we are working hard on them. But as far as the Brezhnev speech last week is concerned, it is not [as heard] encouraging. It is obvious that he would like negotiations.

**Question** Can you state your assessment of the speech specifically once more?

**Answer** I believe that Brezhnev deems it possible to negotiate on the withdrawal of the troops. I hope we will come up with a proposal which will be acceptable to him and to everybody else.

**Question** But to get the whole problem going, it is necessary to talk with the Soviets.

**Answer** I think this is not the most difficult part of it. We must begin, for instance, sending the Italian president of the European Community into the talks. But we can also talk via our ambassadors in our capitals.

**Question** Is your announcement still topical that the Olympic games will be boycotted?

**Answer** We will still advise our athletes not to go, as long as the circumstances have not changed. And the way I understood the attitude of your government it is not much different from ours. We are only starting out at the other end.
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I MAZHI SAYS CARTER CAN EASILY REMOVE TURKS FROM ISLAND

NC280740 Nicosia I MAZHI in Greek 28 Feb 80 p 1 NC

[Editorial: "Carters Big Words"]

[Excerpts] Following charges by Senator Kennedy that President Carter has not kept his promises about Cyprus, that he pressured Congress to lift the embargo against Turkey although there was no progress in the Cyprus problem, President Carter—obviously in order to pacify the powerful Greek-American lobby and in view of the presidential election—has again remembered that there are people in Cyprus who are deprived of basic human rights. He claimed that the United States favors a fair and lasting Cyprus solution and he went as far as saying that even he, just like all civilized people, is a Greek!

When one hears President Carter’s words for the first time, one definitely feels pleased and happy because at last the leader of a superpower cares for Cyprus and its oppressed people, and this leader thinks in a fair and civilized way, like a Greek. But one will break down and will not believe what he hears when he is informed by those who know that President Carter is merely voicing big words, and that there is great distance between his big words and his deeds. In the past the American President has repeatedly given assurances and his word of honor that he was opposed to the presence of Turkish troops {in Cyprus}, that he would work for the restoration of Cyprus, territorial integrity and that he would support a solution based on the principle of "majority rule and protecting the minority." However, President Carter has not kept any promise.

In a few words, President Carter has proved inconsistent and has been caught lying in his effort to secure the support of Greek-Americans in view of the forthcoming presidential election.

If the American President really felt as Greek as he claims and if he cared for Cyprus and its people who are deprived of their basic human rights, he would make decisions and implement measures that would put an end to the injustice against the Cypriot people, because the Turks, who are committing crimes in Cyprus, are puppets in his hands and he can remove them from Cyprus by merely moving his fingers. But he must have the desire to do this.

TERCUMAN REPORTS INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS TO BEGIN IN APRIL

NC280850 Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 26 Feb 80 p 4 NC

[Report by Abdullah Azizoglu]

[Text] Nicosia—It has been learned that the intercommunal negotiations for finding a peaceful settlement to the Cyprus dispute will be held in April. Well-informed sources say that the Greek Cypriots have assured UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim that they will make certain concessions on matters concerning freedom of settlement and ownership, while the Turkish Cypriots have informed the secretary general that they will make some concessions regarding Varosha and the frontiers,

Political observers in Nicosia, however, believe that no matter when the intercommunal negotiations begin, they will yield no positive result unless both sides make tangible concessions. On the other hand, terrorism is mounting on the Greek Cypriot side. Recently a teacher, his daughter and an elderly lady teacher were killed. On the Turkish Cypriot side the casino of a hotel was broken into and 6 million liras stolen.
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EDEN'S LISSARIDHIS ON REFUGEE PROBLEM, OUTCOME OF TALKS

NC270700 Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 27 Feb 80 p 1 NC

[Text] Speaking yesterday at Limou-Flasou, EDEN leader Vasos Lissaridhis declared that an effort is being made to divide the refugees and at the same time deceive them. He also disclosed that a rightwing political leader has told a delegation of refugees that if we want a Cyprus solution we must tell Turkey that we do not insist on the return of the inhabitants of Kyrenia District and other areas to their homes.

This, the socialist leader added, constitutes another clear effort to divide the refugees. On the other hand, it is tantamount to deceiving all the refugees because, if it were accepted, Turkey would again cause a deadlock, and if we appealed, again complaining about violation of human rights and UN resolutions, we would be regarded not as victims but as accomplices, because we ourselves would have agreed to the cancellation of such rights. In this way we would be endorsing the blocking of the refugees' return to their homes.

Referring to the intercommunal talks, the chairman of the socialist party, EDEN, stressed that "today the prospects for the success of the talks are even more gloomy because of the negative attitude of Turkey and its henchman, Denktas." Dr Lissaridhis added: "It is obvious that what Turkey has been seeking is legalizing separation and establishing a protectorate in the north. Those who, instead of unmasking Turkish intransigence, shift the responsibility for the deadlock to our side, are doing a disservice to our national struggle."

Dr Lissaridhis stressed that this is the case when the view is promoted that we must submit fresh proposals to the various aspects of the Cyprus problem, although it is well known that the deadlock has not resulted from our very conciliatory proposals but from the Turkish proposals, which even Turkey's friends have described as unacceptable.

Finally, the chairman of the socialist party, EDEN, stressed that the socialist party does not approve of the government's socio-economic policy.

DENKTAS SAYS EMBARGO WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE TO SOLUTION

TA270935 (Clandestine) Bayrak Radio in Turkish to Cyprus 0900 GMT 27 Feb 80 TA

[Text] President Rauf Denktas has said the statement made by President of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives Mikhailidis to the effect that the embargo and attacks against the Turkish Cypriots on an international level were aimed at safeguarding the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, securing citizens' rights and insure security of those using Cypriot port facilities, was a denial of the existence, rights and status of the Turkish Cypriot community.

Noting that it is evident that the Greek Cypriot leadership intends to maintain its attitude toward the Turkish Cypriot community, which constitutes 25 percent of the island's population, Denktas added: This is where the trouble lies. Waldheim should diagnose this trouble and should call on the Greek Cypriot leadership to pursue the right path. He should stress that as long as the Greek Cypriots do not change their attitude, the doors toward conciliation cannot be opened and that the Greek Cypriot leadership will be held responsible.
Replies to a question on rumors to the effect that Kiprianou will seek the help of the pope regarding the missing persons, Denktas said the Turkish Cypriot leadership has for years been exerting efforts to secure the implementation of the UN third committee decision regarding the missing persons issue. Denktas recalled that the Greek Cypriot leadership has been avoiding the implementation of this decision. Pointing out that the Turkish Cypriot side believed in the effectiveness of the pope, Denktas expressed the hope that the pope will convince Kiprianou to abandon the crusader mentality and to keep the Greek Orthodox Church out of politics.

TPSC MINISTER SCORES UK REFUSAL FOR AIRLINK

TA262101 (Clandestine) Bayrak Radio in Turkish to Cyprus 1930 GMT 26 Feb 80 TA

[Text] The minister of public works and transportation, Erdinç Gürçag, has said that Lord (Treppingham's) refusal to accept an airlink between Ercan Airport and the United Kingdom is proof of the British Government's pro-Greek Cypriot attitude. Gürçag was commenting on the reply given by British Government spokesman Lord (Treppingham) to a question on air communication between Ercan and the United Kingdom by Lord (Stance) in the British House of Lords. Gürçag noted that the reply was completely pro-Greek Cypriot and showed that the British Government acted with full bias. Strongly protesting this attitude, Gürçag said: The fact that the British Government is making decisions based on the deceitful statements of the Greek Cypriot administration— which usurped the Turkish Cypriots' freedom of communications, of travel and all their basic rights and freedoms, by means of armed attacks from December 1963 until the peace operation in 1974— will not change the realities that have been lived through nor the present reality.

Gürçag noted that (the British Government's decision) was encouraged by Greek Cypriot leader Kiprianou who was waging a struggle to usurp the most humanistic rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Gürçag stressed that such views and statements would not intimidate the Turkish Cypriots who will continue to wage their just struggle with their utmost force.

The public works and transportation minister stated that the Ercan Airport was of international standards. He added that Ercan was like a window that insured the Turkish Cypriot community's freedom of travel and that the community would protect it forever.

TURKISH CYPRIOT PRIME MINISTER CRITICIZES ERC ATTITUDE

TA280928 (Clandestine) Bayrak Radio in Turkish to Cyprus 0900 GMT 26 Feb 80 TA

[Text] Prime Minister Mustafa Cagatay has said a turning point has been reached in the relations between the EEC and the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. The prime minister was speaking after a briefing by Hüstem Tatar, who is holding talks with Community officials in Brussels.

Cagatay said the Greek Cypriot administration wanted to develop quickly its relations with the EEC as of 1 January 1981 and to become after Greece, the 11th full member of the EEC. Noting that the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus had achieved no economic results from its contacts with the EEC during the past 3 years, Cagatay said: The reason is that the EEC considers the Greek Cypriot administration the government of the entire island and considers the approval of the Greek Cypriot administration necessary for any aid to be extended to Cyprus.
GUNAYDIN SCORES GENERAL STAFF RESPONSIBILITY IN NOTAM DECISION

"The Situation in Ankara" column by Teman Erkel: "Courage"

[Excerpts] Professor Pahir Armaoglu, though sympathtic with the Justice Party, had the courage to expose the facts. This is what he had to say about the cancellation of NOTAM 714 concerning the Aegean, without distorting the facts: "The question of FIR has entered a new development following the cancellation of NOTAM 714 the other day by the Office of the Chief of General Staff, for the Greek Government too has announced the cancellation of its own NOTAM 1157. This means that the question of the FIR line between Turkey and Greece has been eliminated. To put it more correctly, air traffic control authority over the Aegean reverts to Greece—as between 1952 and 1974. As things stand now, Turkey appears to have given up all claims in this matter." This is the truth, dear readers. Turkey is leaving the control over the Aegean to Athens, surrendering all its claims.

Deputy leader of the Justice Party Yigit Toker made a statement recently, in which he turned over to the chief of General Staff all responsibility for this decision, implying that Turkey has given up its flight control rights and all other claims over the Aegean. Nice, isn't it? This means that the Justice Party minority government has nothing to do with this decision which is of profound importance to our security and future!

Chief of General Staff Gen Evren disclosed last week that the cancellation of NOTAM 714 was discussed and approved at the National Security Council. As far as we know, the National Security Council meeting, which was chaired by President Koruturk, was also attended by the prime minister of the minority government and the ministers concerned. So much so that the civilians at these meetings formed the majority. Suleyman Day [Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel] has a reputation for dexterous handling of such matters at each session.

This means that both government and the president of the republic are involved in this decision. If they did not approve of the transfer to Athens of air control over the Aegean, they could have opposed it. As a matter of fact the National Security Council is a consultative organ. The decisions of the National Security Council are not final. They are only of a consultative nature. If the decision concerning the cancellation of NOTAM 714 was taken by the chief of General Staff, it is impossible to consider the prime minister exempted from responsibility. For the chief of General Staff is a state official responsible to the prime minister.

The government may have been subjected to a memorandum. It may have found it expedient to send to certain internal and external pressures. But what it should not have done was transfer political responsibility to state officials, who are answerable to the government.

If the Justice Party members insist on holding the Office of the Chief of General Staff responsible for the new situation in the Aegean, they may have to answer this question: "Do you mean to say that the Office of the Chief of the General Staff would not listen to you? If that is the case, what business have you being in power?"

In fact many names—including General Rogers, the American NATO commander and German Finance Minister Matthoefer—who discussed aid with the Justice Party minority government, are involved in this bargaining over the Aegean issue.

It is Suleyman Demirel and Turgut Ozal and not Chief of General Staff Gen Evren who are doing the multilateral bargaining in matters such as Cyprus, U.S. bases, the Aegean and economic aid.
ECEVIT OPPOSES LIFTING OF NOTAM, FAVORS COMMUNIST PARTY

TA271635 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1615 GMT 27 Feb 80 TA

[Excerpts] RPP leader Bulent Ecevit has said that Turkish workers employed abroad were concerned over the act that the two large Turkish parties did not cooperate to save Turkey from its present crisis. Ecevit returned home today at 1625 by plane, after visiting Denmark and the FRG.

Replying to a question by a reporter at Ankara's Esenboga Airport on whether the lifting of the NOTAM on the Aegean airspace could be considered a concession in order to secure economic interests, Ecevit said; No matter who lifted the NOTAM, the government is responsible for the lifting. Describing the lifting of the NOTAM as a big mistake no matter whether it was made as a concession or not, Ecevit continued: The government has to account for its decision. The interlocutor of the government [for such an accounting] is not NATO, it is not our allies, it is first and foremost and, especially in such subjects, the Turkish nation. Before such an important resolution was taken, the necessary explanations and reasons that led to such a resolution should have been made in a manner that would satisfy our nation. As far as I can see such a move has not been by the government. We shall deal with this issue to the end.

Recalling his press statements that, if his party came to power he would allow the establishment of a communist party in Turkey, a journalist asked Ecevit to comment on these reports. Ecevit said that his opinion on this matter was not new and that he had made such an announcement earlier. Ecevit added: There are not several kinds of democracies in accordance to their degree of development. If a country has adopted liberal democracy, then it must abide by all its rules.

NATO'S ROGERS MEETS WITH CHIEF OF STAFF, LEAVES FOR BRUSSELS

TA271731 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1600 GMT 27 Feb 80 TA

[Text] Gen Bernard Rogers, the supreme allied commander of NATO, paid a visit to Ankara today which lasted about 5 and 1/2 hours. General Rogers arrived in Ankara at 1300 and met with Chief of the General Staff Gen Kenan Evren for talks. General Rogers was seen off at the Esenboga Airport by the commander of the IV corps and Ankara Garrison, Gen Nihat Ozer. Other generals and officers were also present at his departure.

OZAL RETURNS FROM PARIS OECD MEETING, MAKES STATEMENT

TA272138 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 2000 GMT 27 Feb 80 TA

[Text] Turgut Ozal, under secretary of the Prime Minister's Office and deputy under secretary of the State Planning Organization, has said that Turkey's imports in 1980 would exceed $7 billion. Ozal, who participated in the OECD meeting in Paris, returned home today. In a statement at Istanbul's Yesilkoy Airport, Ozal said that economic measures adopted by Turkey were discussed in the meeting. He added that Turkey's economic program was greatly approved by the OECD members. Pointing out that aid to be extended to Turkey would be disclosed at the OECD meeting to be held on 26 March, Ozal said that most of the aid to be extended this year would not be linked such as those of last year and that efforts were being made for those which are linked to be used easily.

Ozal said that the amount of aid to be extended to Turkey this year would be greater than that of last year. He added that the World Bank's program loan of $200 million would soon be available. He said that the IMF loan had been obtained following the devaluation of the Turkish lira.
Ozal said that as a result of loans to be received, Turkey would be able to bridge its deficit and that the amount of imports, which totalled $4.8 billion last year, would reach more than $7 billion in 1980.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PASSES DEFENSE MINISTRY BUDGET

TA271708 Ankara ANATOLIA in English 1630 GMT 27 Feb 80 TA

[Text] Ankara, Feb 27 (AA)--The National Assembly debated and passed the defense budget for 1980 last night, with spokesmen for various parties voicing their views. Justice Party Deputy Ali Elverdi (Bursa) said Turkey should be strong enough to protect Middle Eastern and Iranian oil. He claimed Turkey was the victim of an attempt by communist organizations to lead the country into civil war. A struggle was going on, he claimed, with the uniforms "unidentified."

RPP Deputy and former Commander of the Navy Kemal Kayacan said the armed forces should be allowed to return to their original function of defense as soon as possible. National Salvation Party spokesman Fehmi Cümalioglu deplored the delays in setting up a national defense industry. Nationalist Action Party Deputy Necati Gultekin said Turkey had to be strong to survive in her strategic location, with a defense force equal to the total force of their neighbors except the Soviet Union. Defense Minister Ahmet Inan Birincioglu said parliament had a major responsibility for insuring the armed forces' return to its proper function.

DEMIREL PROMISES 'FAIRNESS' IN NEW TAX BILL

TA271712 Ankara ANATOLIA in English 1645 GMT 27 Feb 80 TA

[Text] Ankara, Feb 27 (AA)--Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel accused the opposition with fanning the fire while his government tried to stop the "dragon" of inflation. Speaking about the new tax bills submitted by his government at the Justice Party joint parliamentary group, Demirel said the bills included not only taxation, but also an increased minimum levying allowance and a mobile scale. It was a "tax reform" bill, he commented.

It was not pleasant to tax people, Demirel acknowledged, but you cannot have a state without taxation. "It has been left to us to think of the state," he commented, "and we shall not compete in a race for irresponsibility with those who neglect the (state). They say, let us give away funds. We have to take away from someone in order to give away. We first have to have something before we can give away."

The prime minister claimed the state can be broken apart, "not only with bullets, but by opening (?holes) in the treasury." He promised to return to the citizenry what the government took in taxes. "Fairness" would be achieved in taxation, he said.

Demirel said Turkey had paid a petroleum bill of a billion dollars for the first two months of 1980. He hoped several problems could be solved with the importing of adequate supplies of oil.

RELIGIOUS OFFICIALS BANNED FROM COMMENTING ON PARTIES

TA230738 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 2000 GMT 22 Feb 80 TA

[Text] Religious officials who praise or berate political parties, either within or outside the framework of their duties, will be removed from office. A directive issued in the official gazette today cites the disciplinary punishments for the officials employed by the Religious Affairs Directorate Center, and branches inside and outside Turkey.
Under the directive, officials who, while carrying out their duties, discriminate against language, race, gender, political beliefs, philosophical beliefs, religion or sect, will be suspended from office for long periods of time. The same punishment is also envisaged for religious officials who speak or act in ways damaging to national or religious unity.

Under the directive, religious officials who use harsh, rude or offensive language, or who distort religious truths in delivering sermons or who fail to show up at their officer or places of religious service will be punished. The directive also says that religious officials who indulge in magic or witchcraft will be removed from office.

RPP DENIES COOPERATING WITH NSP TO TOPPLE GOVERNMENT

TA241631 Ankara ANATOLIA in English 1553 GMT 24 Feb 80 TA

[Text] Ankara, 24 Feb (AA)—RPP Secretary General Mustafa Ustundag denied rumors of a RPP-NSP [National Salvation Party] decision to cooperate in toppling the government. At a press conference Sunday, Ustundag said no decision had been taken by RPP's competent organs concerning any attempt to bring down the government.

BRIEFS

SMUGGLING AGREEMENT WITH BULGARIA--A Turkish-Bulgarian agreement was signed Tuesday in Ankara for cooperation against smuggling. Signing the document at the Foreign Ministry were the director general for foreign agreements from the Turkish Ministry of Customs and Monopolies and Bulgaria's director general of customs. Turkey was particularly concerned with stopping arms smuggling, Foreign Ministry sources said, while Bulgaria was more interested in stopping the traffic in narcotics. Under the agreement, customs check points at Edirne and Svilengrad will be equipped to deal with smuggling. The two countries will exchange information and documents in general and will consult more closely for specific cases of smuggling. The details of cooperation against smuggling will be worked out later. [Text] [Ankara ANATOLIA in English 1450 GMT 26 Feb 80 TA]

BORDER TRADE WITH IRAN--It has been announced that 3,000 tons of diesel oil and fuel oil were imported from Iran during the first 2 months of this year within the framework of a border trade agreement signed between the office of the governor of Agri and of the general governor of West Azerbaijan. According to information from Agri Governor Tuncel Perciner, food was exported to Iran in exchange for oil. Perciner added that such transactions are expected to continue. Perciner said that 40 tons of diesel oil and 120 tons of fuel oil imported from Iran 5 days a week were then distributed to meet the needs of the Agri, Kars, Erzurum and Van provinces. [Text] [Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1400 GMT 27 Feb 80 TA]

CAPTURE OF IRANIAN SMUGGLER--Van, Feb 27 (AA)—Five Iranian arms smugglers clashed with the Turkish gendarmerie at the Turkish-Iranian border and one of them was wounded and captured. The smugglers returned the warning fire of gendarmes with bullet fire and the clash lasted for 2 hours. The smugglers were believed to be attempting to cross the border into Turkey. [Text] [Ankara ANATOLIA in English 1625 GMT 27 Feb 80 TA]
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DANISH EMBASSY TO HANDLE CANADIAN PROBLEMS IN IRAN

LD280917 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 Feb 80 part 1 p 5 LD

[Unattributed report: "Iran Satisfied With Danish Diplomacy"]

[Text] The Iranian Government regards Denmark as one of the relatively few countries to be on very friendly terms with Iran. The news on Thursday that the Danish Embassy in Tehran is taking over the Canadian Consulate and looking after the problems of Canadian citizens in Iran has been welcomed by the Iranian Government, according to Ambassador Troels Munk in Tehran.

The Canadian Embassy was closed when it became known that Canadian diplomats smuggled six U.S. diplomats out of Iran with false papers.

PREPARATORY GROUP FOR DISARMAMENT FORUM MEETS IN VIENNA

AU260913 Vienna VOLKSTIMME in German 23 Feb 80 p 4 AU

[Text] Vienna--In the period 19-21 February, a preparatory meeting was held in Vienna for the international forum "Dialog for Disarmament and Detente." The meeting was convened by the International Liaison Forum of the Peace Forces and by the Austrian Coordination Committee for Peace Work. The participants represented political parties and non-state organizations from 23 countries. The meeting was also attended by an observer from the UN Disarmament Commission.

It was decided to hold the international forum 3-5 June 1980 in Vienna. This conference is to serve an extensive exchange of opinions about international problems, especially about the possibilities of intensifying endeavors for detente and disarmament.

Within the framework of the preparatory committee, the general problems of safeguarding peace and the most recent international developments were discussed. The participants expressed their grave concern over the increasing rearmament and called for the continuation and expansion of all forms of cooperation and exchanges between the nations, such as in the fields of culture, sports, economy and science, and primarily for conferences and negotiations on detente, disarmament and development.

PORTUGAL

PCP-R SCORES SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN

LD271018 Lisbon Domestic Service in Portuguese 0400 GMT 27 Feb 80 LD

[Text] In Lisbon yesterday, the Portuguese Communist Party-Reformed (PCP-R) criticized the Soviet Union's conduct in Afghanistan. The PCP-R said in a statement that what has been taking place in Kabul recently was a wave of barbarous repression unleashed against the people of Afghanistan by the Soviet occupation troops, but that the Afghan people were fiercely resisting the Soviet troops.
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